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LAND AND WATE=R
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME III

1968

NUMBER 2

In the first part of this article, which appeared in Volume III,
Number 1, the authors discussed the appropriation and the form of
permissible appropriations of public mineral lands. Here the authors
continue their discussion of location requirements and examine the
influence of modern hard mineral exploration methods on the "discovery" requirement of the mining laws applicable to the public
domain in Wyoming.

MINING LAW IN A NUCLEAR AGE:
THE WYOMING EXAMPLE t
Don H. Sherwood*
Gary L. Greer"
INTRODUCTION TO PART II

T

HE statutory alternative between lode and placer mining

claims' has already been considered, ' and in this part of
the article we will examine the "discovery" requirement
applicable generally in Wyoming to both kinds of mining
t Copyright@ Don H. Sherwood and Gary L. Greer, 1968. The first part of
this article on Wyoming mining law appeared in 3 LAND & WATER L. REv.
1 (1968).
* Associate, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado; B.S.,
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the Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations. Mr. Sherwood is
presently Adjunct Professor of Natural Resources Law at the University
of Denver College of Law and the representative of the hard rock mining
industry on the United States Bureau of Land Management Colorado Advisory Board. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and a Supplement Author of THE
AMERICAN LAw OF MINING (1968).
** Associate, Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado;
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1957, Columbia College; LL.B., 1964, University of Colorado; Order of the
Coif; Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Scholar; Member of the
Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations. Mr. Greer is presently
an Instructor of property law at the University of Denver College of Law
and a Supplement Author of THE AMERICAN LAW OF MINING (1968). He
is the author of Milleites: Nonmineral Mining Claims, 15 RocKy MT.
MINERAL L. INST. 143 (1967).
1. "[V] eins or lodes of . . . rock in place bearing . . . valuable deposits" of
minerals are to be located as lodes, 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964), while 30 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1964) specifies the use of placer claims for "all forms of deposit"
excepting lodes.
2. Sherwood & Greer, Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example,
8 LAND & WATER L. REV.1, 12-32 (1968).
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claims. But solving the puzzle of whether a particular mineral
deposit is a lode or a placer does not fully determine whether
and how that deposit is locatable 3 The Federal mining laws
provide for other kinds of locations, and there are several
varieties of placer claims. It is therefore appropriate to
summarize the law bearing on locatability and on the choice
of forn of location before proceeding to an investigation of
location procedures and the discovery requirement.
LOCATABILITY OF PARTICULAR KINDS OF MINERALS
AND MINERAL LANDS

We have heretofore discussed the appropriation of publicly owned lands, under the Federal mining laws, in terms

of "locatable public domain" not segregated from mineral
entry by the Government or by prior valid claims.4 But
locatability depends upon more than the status of publicly
owned lands and their mineral character. In the first place,
it should be obvious that some materials found on the public
domain are not minerals and will not support the location
of a mining claim.6 Furthermore, some substances which are
in fact minerals, in the broad sense,' are, like coal,7 not subject to location under the mining laws.
That some minerals are not locatable is the result of the
fact that the Federal mining laws, which, once applied to
all kinds of minerals, except coal,8 have been amended from
3. Locatability was discussed in Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at 6-12, with
reference to "publicly owned mineral land." Id. at 6.
4. Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at 6-12.
5. Peat, for example, which is not a mineral, is not locatable under the mining
laws. United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440 (D. Mont. 1963). See also
United States v. Mattey, 67 Interior Dec. 63 (1960), as to clay, common
varieties of which are disposable under 30 U.S.C. § 601 (1964), although
uncommon varieties are not locatable under 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1964).
6. Strictly defined, a mineral is a naturally-occurring, inorganic, homogenous
substance with a definite chemical composition capable of being expressed
by a chemical formula. See FAY, GLOSSARY OF THE MINING AND MINERAL
INDusTRY (1920, reprint 1947) (adopting Dana's definition). But such a
definition eliminates many substances which are minerals in the broader
sense that they occur naturally and are neither animal nor vegetable, even
if they once were. Thus, the mineral fuels, such as oil, coal, lignite, and
other hydrocarbons, and gases such as helium, are "mineral" in the sense
that they are often so regarded.
7. See note 6 supra and note 8 infra.
8. Coal became the subject of special legislation, Act of July 1, 1864, ch. 205,
13 Stat. 343, prior to the adoption of the original mining law in 1866, Act
of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251. The statutory exclusion of certain
kinds of mineral deposits from location under the mining laws is a Twentieth
Century development. See note 9 infra. The Coal Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch.
279, §§ 1-6, 17 Stat. 607, 30 U.S.C. §§ 71-76 (1964), which provides for the
entry of coal beds or coal fields, has been said to be now applicable only
"to coal found on some Indian reservations. By the leasing Act of 1920 all
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time to time over the years to exclude certain minerals from
location.9 Occasionally, the existence of locatable minerals
in association with minerals excluded from location 0 may
prevent appropriation of the locatable minerals,1 ' and yet
other coal deposits on the public domain are acquirable by lease rather than
by entry." C. MARTz, CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES 517 (1951). Compare
Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914) (patents
to soldiers' additional homestead entries in Wyoming cancelled as fraudulently obtained to acquire coal beds not then actually disclosed therein)
with United States v. Lonabaugh, 158 F. 314 (D. Wyo. 1907), rev'd on
other grounds, Lonabaugh v. United States, 179 F. 476 (8th Cir. 1910)
(criminal prosecution based upon attempt to accomplish indirectly what is
directly prohibited by the Coal Act, which restricts the total acreage which
can be acquired by any one person or association).
9. At one time, "lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils, and chiefly
valuable therefor," were locatable as placers under the Act of Feb. 11, 1897,
ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526, formerly 30 U.S.C. § 101. Cf. 30 U.S.C. §§ 102-104
(1964), which are still applicable to oil placers located prior to February
25, 1920. The former 30 U.S.C. § 101 "was superseded by the Mineral
Leasing Act of February 25, 1920," although oil placer claims "made prior
to the passage of said act are to be considered as though made thereunder."
43 C.F.R. § 3416.9 (1968). Many oil placer claims were located in Wyoming
and a number of cases concerning such claims appear in the reports, but
they will be discussed herein only to the extent they relate to current provisions of the Federal mining laws. Lands "containing salt springs, or
deposits of salt in any form, and chiefly valuable therefor," were locatable
as placer claims under the Act of Jan. 31, 1901, ch. 186, 31 Stat. 745, now
30 U.S.C. § 162 (1964), but the Regulations of the Department of the
Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 3416.8 (1967), conclude that "saline (sodium) deposits
were made subject to disposal by leases instead of mining locations" by the
Mineral Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437. This conclusion
assumes, however, that Congress, by making chlorides of sodium (salt) leaseable in 1920, made salt springs as well as salt deposits leaseable even though
Congress did not repeal 30 U.S.C. § 162 (1964). Compare the discussion of
30 U.S.C. § 161 (1964) in note 28 infra. In 1917, Congress subjected potash
deposits to special leasing legislation. Act of Oct. 2, 1917, ch. 62, 40 Stat.
297. The Mineral Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437, made
deposits of coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas, and sodium exclusively subject
to leasing; sulphur was made subject to leasing in Louisiana in 1926, Act
of Apr. 17, 1926, ch. 158, § 1, 44 Stat. 301, and in New Mexico in 1932.
Act of July 16, 1932, ch. 498, 47 Stat. 701. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (1964).
The 1917 potash leasing provisions were replaced by a potassium leasing
act in 1927. Act of Feb. 7, 1927, ch. 66, 44 Stat. 1057. See 30 U.S.C.
§§ 281-287 (1964). Deposits "of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel,
pumice, pumicite, or cinders," and deposits of petrified wood, were excluded
from location under the mining laws by the Act of July 23, 1955, Pub. L.
No. 84-167, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368, as amended by the Act of Sept. 28,
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-713, § 1, 76 Stat. 652, now 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1964), as
amended. By the Act of Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-705, 74 Stat. 790,
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was extended to native asphalt, bitumens,
and bituminous rock. See 30 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). As to the acquisition of
materials found on the public lands which are not subject to specific leasing laws, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1964). See also 43 C.F.R. § 3400.2
(1968).
10. The occurrence of minerals of both kinds in the same deposit is distinguishable from the situation presented by the separate existence of different
mineral deposits in the same lands. For the most part, the latter problem
has been corrected by the Multiple Mineral Development Act of Aug. 13,
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-585, ch. 730, 68 Stat. 708, as amended, now 30 U.S.C.
§§ 521-531 (1964), and similar legislation. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 12, 1953,
ch. 405, 67 Stat. 539, now 30 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1964), and Act of Aug. 11,
1955, ch. 795, 69 Stat. 679, now 30 U.S.C. §§ 541-541i (1964). Cf. Bloomenthal, Multiple Mineral Development on the Public Domain, 9 Wyo. L.J. 139
(1955).
11. This is, at least, the position taken in Anderson, Acquiring Rights to Minerals Associated With or Contained in Oil Shale, 13 RocuY MT. MINERAL
L. INST. 233 (1967). Cf. Comment, The "Associated Minerals" Dilemma
and the New Federal Oil Shale Policy, 39 U. COLO. L. Rnv. 370 (1967).
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the converse is also true. 2 Locatability may, in some cases,
even depend upon an evaluation18 of the land in which certain
deposits are found, 4 or upon the "variety" of minerals comprising the deposits found on the land."5 Furthermore, the
discovery of minerals subject to location will not support
an appropriation under the mining laws unless the deposit
qualifies as a "valuable" mineral deposit. 6 The criterion of
value sufficient to validate a mining claim as against the
paramount title of the United States, however, is beyond the
scope of this article and, in any event, seldom arises in
disputes between miners. 7
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF LOCATION

It is correct to say that locatable publicly owned mineral
land is appropriated, under the Federal mining laws, by the
location of either lode or placer mining claims,"8 depending
on the nature of the mineral deposit discovered. 9 But there
are other forms of location, and it is important for the
lawyer to distinguish between them.
12. Seams, beds, or deposits of lignite containing valuable uranium, thorium, or
other atomic energy source materials are locatable. 30 U.S.C. §§ 541, 541e
(1964), derived from the Uraniferous Lignite Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 795,
t§ 1, 6, 69 Stat. 679. Cf. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1964).
13. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 161 (1964), which provides that lands chiefly valuable
for building stone are locatable. But see note 28 infra.
14. See note 9 supra, and compare note 28 infra, discussing statutes which
were generally passed to authorize the use of the placer form of location
as well as (or, perhaps, rather than) to confirm the locatability of a particular kind of mineral.
15. The Act of July 23, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-167, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 367, as
amended, amending the Materials Disposal Act of July 31, 1947, ch. 406,
61 Stat. 681 (now combined as 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1964)), excluded
deposits of "common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite,
cinders and . . . petrified wood" from location under the mining laws. But
"deposits of such materials which are valuable because the deposit has
some property giving it distinct and special value" and "'block pumice'
which occurs in nature in pieces having one dimension of two inches or
more" are still locatable. Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3511.1 (b) (1968), defining "limestone suitable for use in the production of cement, metallurgical or chemical
grade limestone, gypsum, and the like" as locatable. The authors are not,
however, aware of any published decisions of the Department of the Interior
finding deposits of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, cinders or petrified
wood to be valuable because of distinct and special properties (other than
those specified), and none are cited in Barry, Determination of What Constitutes "Common Varieties," 12 RoCKY MT. MINwEAL L. INST. 225 (1967).
To rely on the distinct and special properties exception rather than the
materials disposal provisions of 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1964), which covers
common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, cinders, clay,
etc., is apparently to invite a contest by the Bureau of Land Management.
16. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 23, 85 (1964).
17. As to the issue of value in such disputes, see infra at note 198.
18. See 48 C.F.R. § 3410.0-6 (1968) : "Mining claims are of two distinct classes:
Lode claims and placers."
19. 80 U.S.C. §§ 23, 35 (1964). See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at 12-32.
The confusion between lodes in placers and lode claims in placer claims has
been discussed. Id. at 12, n.62.
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The mining laws provide for two distinct classes of
appropriation: Mining claims based upon the discovery of
valuable mineral deposits 20 and nonmineral claims located for
either exploration" or other mining purposes.22 We have
so far limited our attention to mining claims and the choice
between the two principal types-lodes and placers-because
mining purpose claims, of which there are two principal types
20. "[N]o location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of a
vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964).
"Claims usually called 'placers,' . . . shall be subject to entry . . . under
like circumstances and conditions . . . as are provided for vein or lode
claims . . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). Cf. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964) which opens
"valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States" to
exploration, occupation and purchase, and compare 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1964)
which reserves "lands valuable for minerals" from sale. The relationship
of 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1964) to 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964) is discussed in Sherwood
& Greer, supra note 2, at 1, n.1, and at 6, nn.28, 30.
21. Tunnels "run . . . for the discovery of mines" are provided for in 30 U.S.C.
§ 27 (1964). Cf. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3415.1 to 3415.3 (1968). If properly located,
and prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the owners of tunnels "run for
the development of a vein or lode, or for the discovery of mines . . . shall
have the right of possession of all veins or lodes within three thousand
feet from the face of such tunnel on the line thereof, not previously known
to exist, discovered in such tunnel, to the same extent as if discovered
from the surface .... ." 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964); Enterprise Mining Co. v.
Rico-Aspen Consol. Mining Co., 167 U.S. 108, 111-112 (1908). A Regulation
of the Department of the Interior attempts to limit the statute to "blind
lodes . . . not previously known to exist," and to restrict its applicability
where "lodes appear upon the surface." 43 C.F.R. § 3415.1 (1968). The
Regulation assumes that the law of the apex, 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), overrides the discovery provisions of 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964), and in this respect
is clearly wrong. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.38 (1963) which,
incidentally, points out that 43 C.F.R. § 3415.2 (1968) is inconsistent with
43 C.F.R. § 3415.1 (1968) and that the intent of Congress may be achieved
by the prohibition of 43 C.F.R. § 3415.2 (1968) against "prospecting for
lodes not previously known to exist . . . while work on the tunnel is being
prosecuted with reasonable diligence." We classify the "tunnel-site" claim,
whether run for development or discovery, as a "nonmineral" or mining
purpose claim because its validity is not dependent upon the disclosure of
a valuable mineral deposit.
22. There are four kinds of "mining purpose" claims, one of which, the development tunnel provided for in 30 U.S.C. §§ 27, 28 and 43 (1964), is probably
not a claim at all, unless located under 43 C.F.R. §§ 3415.2 and 3415.3 (1968)
as a discovery tunnel. Two of the other three kinds of nonmineral claims
(all of which are commonly but somewhat loosely thought of as mining
claims) are incorrectly referred to as "millsite" claims. Five-acre claims
for "nonmineral land . . . used or occupied by the proprietor of [a] . . .
vein or lode for mining or milling purposes," 30 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1964)
(emphasis added), and for "nonmineral land . . . needed by the proprietor
of a placer claim for mining, milling, processing, beneficiation, or other
operations in connection with such claims, and . . . used or occupied by the
proprietor for such purposes," 30 U.S.C. § 42(b) (1964) (emphasis added),
may be located in conjunction with the proprietors' mining claims and purchased at the price per acre specified for the claims upon which they are
dependent. The true (or independent) millsite is provided for in 30 U.S.C.
§ 42(a) (1964) which gives to "the owner of a quartz mill or reduction
works, not owning a mine in conjunction therewith," the same right to
locate five-acre claims as is enjoyed by the proprietor of a lode claim. As
to "illsites" generally, see Greer, Millsites: Nonmineral Mining Claims,
13 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 143 (1967), and 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING §§ 5.31 to 5.37 (1963).
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in the Wyoming

cases. 25

2

Vol. III

-have not been discussed

As to this latter class of appro-

priation, 6the Wyoming lawyer must look elsewhere for
authority.

As to mining claims, the nature of the mineral deposit
discovered will, as we have seen, determine the type of claim
which should be used, 7 but it will not fix the form of location
23.

24.
25.

26.
27.

The location of tunnel claims in Wyoming is governed by 43 C.F.R. §§ 3415.2
and 3415.3 (1968), since Wyoming has no statutory location procedure
specifically governing tunnels run for the discovery of mines. But as to
tunnels run for the development of mines, see WYo. STAT. §§ 30-28.1 and
30-28.2 (1957), compiled from the Law of Mar. 6, 1967, ch. 244, §§ 1-2,
[1967] Wyo. Laws 712, which provides a right of eminent domain for
underground passages in certain cases, and compare Note, Rights of Way
to Mining Claims Across Public Lands in Wyoming, 12 Wyo. L.J. 162 (1958),
with 30 U.S.C. § 43 (1964) and the more recent United States v. 9,947.71
Acres of Land, 220 F. Supp. 328 (D. Nev. 1963), and "Access Over Public
Lands," 66 Interior Dec. 361 (1959). With regard to tunnel-sites, see also
notes 21-22 supra.
See note 22 supra.
The Territorial Legislature did provide for tunnel claims and millsites in
the Law of Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22, §§ 11, 12, 13 and 19, [1869] Wyo. Laws
309-311, but all four sections of that law were repealed by the Law of Dec.
13, 1873, ch. 17, § 1, [1873] Wyo. Laws 176. Section 11 of the 1869 Act
was limited to "'blind' or non-cropping ledges" and the discovery of "a
ledge or lode by means of a tunnel" entitled the discoverer "to an extra
or additional claim of two hundred feet for the discovery." Law of Dec. 2,
1869, ch. 22, § 12, [1869] Wyo. Laws 310. Section 13 of the 1869 Act gave
tunnel owners the rights to minerals extracted from lodes claimed to be
previously discovered and worked by others on the surface above the tunnel
until the ownership thereof was established in favor of the surface owners
by intersecting the tunnel with workings from the surface. These sections,
which were geared to the Federal mining law of 1866, Act of July 26, 1866,
ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, were repealed shortly after the adoption of the Federal
tunnel-site statute, now 30 U.S.C. § 27 (1964), in the Act of May 10, 1872,
ch. 152, § 4, 17 Stat. 91. Section 19 of the 1869 Act, which granted the
right to locate "a tract of land not exceeding five hundred feet square" to
"persons claiming mill sites for quartz mills," was similarly repealed after
the adoption of the first millsite statute in the Act of May 10, 1872, ch.
152, § 15, 17 Stat. 91.
See notes 21-24 supra, and the materials there mentioned.
See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at 12-32, as to the distinction between
lode and placer deposits. The Wyoming statutes strengthen the reliance
which the locator may place upon the dictum in Globe Mining Co. v.
Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 377-378 n.4 (1957), that strata-type
deposits may be lodes in certain cases. See WYO. STAT. § 30-9 (1957),
which provides for the relocation of abandoned strata claims "by sinking a
new discovery shaft . . . in the same manner as provided for the location
of a new claim." Since discovery shafts are required only for lode claims,
WYO. STAT. §§ 30-3, 30-6 and 30-7 (1957), and not for placer claims, WYO.
STAT. § 30-10 (1957), it is clear that the Legislature has contemplated
location of strata as well as fissures [a term used in conjunction with "vein"
and "lode" in WYO. STAT. § 30-3 (1957)] since the first use of those words
in the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, §§ 5 and 15, [1886] Wyo. Laws 440,
444-445, when the lode notice provision still referred only to mineral lodes.
Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 3, [1886] Wyo. Laws 439. The expansion
of the latter to the "mineral lead, lode, ledge or vein" language now found
in WYo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957) occurred two years later. Law of Mar. 6, 1888,
ch. 40, § 15, [1888] Wyo. Laws 87. Section 2 of the Law of Mar. 12, 1886,
ch. 115, [1886] Wyo. Laws 439, also mentioned "crevices" in conjunction with
lodes and veins, but this word was deleted by the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch.
40, §§ 14 and 26, [1888] Wyo. Laws 87, 91. The emphasis is clearly on the
nature of the deposit as rock in place, and the use of placer claims for
the location of mineralized leads, lodes, ledges, veins, strata, or fissures
is patently dangerous.
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which may be used if the kind of mineral discovered subjects
the location of the deposit to a special provision of the mining
laws. Thus, lands "chiefly valuable for building stone" may 8
be locatable as placer claims under the Act of August 4,
1892. -" Furthermore, once it is determined that a particular
deposit must or may be located as a placer, there are two
different kinds of placer locations which may be used, depending on the number of individuals participating in the location.
While an individual can locate any number of placer
claims, each such claim is limited to not more than twenty
acres in surface area,30 and there must, of course, be a discovery on each claim.8 Beginning at noon on the first day
of September after location, the required annual labor must
be performed on each claim for each succeeding assessment
year, if the locator intends to protect his claims against
forfeiture to others by relocation. 2 But an association of
two or more individuals"3 may hold up to 160 acres as a single
28. See Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. granted,
88 S.Ct. 476 (1967). The question of whether the Common Varieties Act
of July 23, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-167, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368, now 30 U.S.C.
611 (1964), repealed the Building Stone Act of Aug. 4, 1892, ch. 375,
§1, 3, 27 Stat. 348, now 30 U.S.C. § 161 (1964), by implication, or limited
the applicability of the latter Act, also by implication, to uncommon
varieties of building stone, is presently unsettled, pending the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the Coleman case. But compare 43
C.F.R. § 3416.7 (1967), recognizing the Act of Aug. 4, 1892, as extending
"the mineral land laws so as to bring lands chiefly valuable for building
stone within the provisions of said laws," with the Timber and Stone Act,
which, as amended by the Act of Aug. 4, 1892, ch. 375, § 2, 27 Stat. 348,
formerly 43 U.S.C. § 311, was expressly repealed by the Act of Aug. 1,
1955, ch. 448, 69 Stat. 434, nine days after the passage of the Act of July
23, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-167, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368, now 30 U.S.C. § 611
(1964), which excluded deposits of "common varieties of . . . stone" from
location under the mining laws. Cf. Note, 2 LAND & WATER L. Rnv. 365
(1967); Comment, "Common Varieties" and the "Distinct and Special
Value" Exception in the Mining Act of 1955, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 220 (1966) ;
Comment, Present Marketability as a Requirement for Locating Mining
Claims on Public Lands, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 418 (1967), and Comment,
Present Marketability: A Proper Test of Mineral Value Under the Mining
Law, 9 ARiz. L. REv. 70 (1967), reprinted in 5 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. REv.
18 (1967).
29. Ch. 375, §§ 1, 3, 27 Stat. 348, now 30 U.S.C. § 161 (1964). Cf. note 28 supra.
30. No placer "location shall include more than twenty acres for each individual
claimant ...." 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3416.1(b) (1968);
Riverside Sand & Cement Mfg. Co. v. Hardwick, 16 N.M. 479, 120 P. 323
(1911).
31. 30 U.S.C. §§ 23, 35 (1964). E. DR SOTO & A. MORRISON, MORRISON'S MINING
RIGHTS 262 (16th ed. 1936).
32. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
33. "[N]o location of a placer claim . . . shall exceed one hundred and sixty
acres for any one . . .assosciation of persons . . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 36 (1964).
"[N]o location of a placer claim can be made to exceed 160 acres, whatever
may be the number of locators associated together .. .and . . . no location
can exceed 20 acres for each individual participating therein; that [is] . ..,
a location by two persons can not exceed 40 acres, and one by three persons
can not exceed 60 acres." 43 C.F.R. § 3416.1(c) (1968).
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placer claim." Only one discovery within the boundaries of
such an association placer claim is required to validate the
claim,5 and the entire claim is treated as one location for
the purpose of determining the amount of assessment work
which must be performed to maintain the claim thereafter."
The advantages of association for the purpose of locating
placer claims are obvious, but so are the temptations to form
"dummy" associations for the purpose of obtaining those
advantages.37 The dummy association works a fraud both
on the United States and on other prospectors. 8
Although the formation of a true association for the
purpose of locating and holding an association placer claim
is certainly justifiable, and the claim so held perfectly valid,
even valid association placer claims are subject to certain
risks which can lead to disasters no less real than those which
have been suffered by dummy associations. Thus, the conveyance of a true association's interest in an association
34. 30 U.S.C. § 36 (1964); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3416.1(a), (c) (1968).
35. 43 C.F.R. § 3416.2 (1968); Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 854
(1908). Cf. E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 262.
36. E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 136. Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3416.6
(1968). As to discovery work, the rule would be the same, thus requiring
only one discovery shaft, Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856, 859 (1908),
except for the fact that in Wyoming discovery shafts are not required on
placer claims of any kind. WYO. STAT. § 30-10(5) (1957).
37. 2 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 450, at 1062-1068 (3d ed. 1914); E. DE SOTO & A.
MORRISON, supra note 31, at 262-263.
38. Although there is early authority that only the Government can complain
of the fraud committed against it by the use of dummy locators, Mitchell v.
Cline, 84 Cal. 409, 24 P. 164 (1890); Riverside Sand & Cement Mfg. Co.,
16 N.M. 479, 120 P. 323 (1911), the accepted view is that "the question may
be investigated and determined where the original parties to the fraud or
persons having notice are before the court." 2 C. LINDLEY, supra note 37,
§ 450, at 1067. See also Cook v. Klonos, 164 F. 529 (9th Cir. 1908). A
classic example of a true dummy locator case is United States v. Brookshire
Oil Co., 242 F. 718 (S.D. Cal. 1917). A located an association claim in the
names of eight persons and then entered into a contract with an oil
company for the development of the claim. The eight locators were relatives of A, but A had no authority to locate for them. The eight locators
were unaware of A's conduct until A requested and obtained from them
deeds conveying their interests for a nominal consideration. The Government brought suit and obtained a decree invalidating the claim. It was
held that A acquired no rights against the Government and that the defendant oil company, which was in possession under a conveyance from A, had
an interest which was of necessity no better than A's. In United States v.
Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil Co., 266 F. 142 (S.D. Cal. 1918), A, an
individual, made a paper location in the name of B and seven others. B
and the others knew nothing of the location. At A's request the seven
others conveyed to B in trust for A. B then conveyed to A. There was
no consideration for any of the conveyances. A then made a deal with an
oil company. The United States brought a suit in equity to invalidate the
claim in the hands of the defendant oil company. It was held that the land
was the property of the United States. The court said that, if valid, the
scheme would have enabled A to acquire more land than the law permits
by one location. Hence, the location was invalid and since A gained nothing
by the conveyance from B, A could convey nothing to the oil company. The
case was affirmed on appeal. 266 F. 145 (9th Cir. 1920). Cf. note 39, infra.
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placer claim to a single individual or corporation, whether
or not the grantee is a member of the association, prior to the
time an actual discovery is made on the claim, can invalidate
all or most of the claim. 9 Furthermore, abandonment by one
mnember of the association of his undivided interest in the
claim may jeopardize the entire claim if the land is no longer
open to location,4" whether the remaining owners can forfeit
a defaulting co-locator's interest for failure to contribute to
the required annual assessment work4 1 or not.4 2 Finally, until
a discovery has been made on a true association claim, the
creation of unequal interests in the claim will jeopardize its
validity."
The danger in utilizing association placers is well illustrated by the cases involving the now-obsolete oil placer
association claim 4 and the relief Congress provided for such
39. H. H. Yard, 38 Interior Dec. 59 (1909); Bakersfield Fuel & Oil Co., 39
Interior Dec. 460 (1911). In one class of case, the validity of a claim has
been challenged by a third party in a proceeding adverse to a patent
application. In such cases the courts have often permitted the defendantpatent applicant to select twenty acres to which it would have been entitled
as an individual locator with one discovery. See Gird v. California Oil Co.,
60 F. 531 (S.D. Cal. 1894), and Durant v. Corbin, 94 F. 382 (D. Wash.
1899). It should be noted that in cases in which the option to select twenty
acres is accorded, it appears that the parties receiving the benefit of the
option either did not participate in a dummy locator fraud or, if they were
grantees, did not have knowledge of any fraud. Rooney v. Barnette, 200
F. 700 (9th Cir. 1912).
40. "A mining claim may be declared null and void as to the interests of some
of the locators while a contest may be carried on against others." United
States v. Robert N. Johnson, A-30828, GFS (Mining) SO-1968-12, at 4
(Jan. 29, 1968), citing Union Oil Co. of Cal., 72 Interior Dec. 313 (1965).
When an undivided interest in an association placer claim is abandoned, it
either inures to the remaining co-locators, Wiltsee v. Utley, 79 Cal. App. 2d
71, 179 P.2d 13 (1947), or it reverts to the United States, in which case a
relocation would be necessary to take up the abandoned interest, as in the
case of lode claims, Wyo. STAT. § 30-9 (1957); Conn v. Oberto, 32 Colo. 313,
76 P. 369 (1904) ; Oberto v. Smith, 37 Colo. 21, 86 P. 86 (1906). If there
were originally eight locators, and 160 acres claimed, the claim would
immediately become too large in either case. If the ground is not open
to relocation, and it is necessary to relocate, it is difficult to see how the
remaining seven locators could relocate the ground, either as a 140 acre
claim or, of course, as a full 160 acre claim, even with an additional locator.
In either event, agreements binding the co-locators to make conveyances of
their individual interests to a designated grantee or to the association,
though desirable from a practical standpoint, create obvious hazards. See
note 38 supra.
41. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
42. See Hamilton v. Ertl, 146 Colo. 80, 360 P.2d 660 (1961). This case holds
that one co-locator performing annual labor may forfeit out the interests
of his non-contributing co-locators, even where the land is not open to
relocation, and the dissent argues that since the annual labor was unnecessary, because the land had been withdrawn, the co-locators' interest could
not be forfeited for failure to contribute to work which was not required.
43. Nome & Sinook Co. v. Snyder, 187 F. 385 (9th Cir. 1911); Rooney v. Barnette, 200 F. 700 (9th Cir. 1912).
44. See note 9 supra, and the cases mentioned in 2 C. LINDLEY, supra note 37,

§ 450.
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oil claims4" but not for any other kind of association placer
claim. 4" In view of the rule47 that the miner chooses between
the lode and the placer form of location at his peril because
the discovery of a lode will not support a placer location
and vice versa, the handy generalization that all locatable
mineral deposits should be claimed as placers, except those
which should be claimed as lodes, is not only useless but
serves as a dangerous invitation to careless or indiscriminate
use of placer claims by those attracted to placer claims because
of the advantages in locating, maintaining, and purchasing
placer-and especially association placer-claims.
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE LOCATOR

Citizenship, or a proper declaration of intention to become
a citizen, is the only statutory qualification specified for those
who would locate mining claims on the public domain,4" and
provision is made for proof of citizenship by individuals, unA "corporaincorporated associations, and corporations."
45.

46.
47.
48.

49.

It was once a custom in California for eight locators to stake an association
oil placer claim and convey it to a corporation prior to discovery so that
the corporation could validate a 160 acre claim with a discovery in one
drill hole. In 1909 the Department of Interior held this practice invalid
in the case of H. H. Yard, 38 Interior Dec. 59 (1909). The practice was
validated, as to oil, by the Act of March 2, 1911, ch. 201, § 1, 36 Stat. 1015,
30 U.S.C. § 103 (1964), apparently as the result of the recommendation of
the Secretary in the Yard case. Subsequently, in United States ex rel.
United States Borax Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1938), it was
held that a corporation could not purchase the pre-discovery pedis possessio
of the original locators and perfect an entire association placer claim by a
single subsequent discovery as against the govermnent where the claim
was not for oil. The court in the Borax case did suggest, in dictum, id. at
275, that a corporation might arguably so perfect a 160 acre claim as to
be able to hold it as against third parties.
United States ex rel. United States Borax Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 271 (D.C.
Cir. 1938).
Cole v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286 (1920).
30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964) opens valuable mineral deposits "to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase,
by citizens of the United States and those who have declared their intention
to become such, under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the
local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as
the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United
States."
30 U.S.C. § 24 (1964). See also Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo.
133, 128 P. 881, reh'g denied, 129 P. 1023 (1913), where the Court held that
a recital as to citizenship in an original location certificate, even though
not required by statute, is prima facie evidence of the locators' citizenship
necessary to qualify them to locate a mining claim. This is in accord with
the Federal statute, which permits citizenship to be proved, for the purpose
of location, by an individual's "own affidavit thereof," and by an authorized
agent's affidavit "made on his own knowledge, or upon information and
belief," in behalf of an unincorporated association. 30 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
But in Dean, an acknowledged affidavit was attached to the certificate of
location, by an authorized agent of the unincorporated association which
located the claim, attesting to the truth of the contents of the certificate,
which recited that each locator was a citizen of the United States. This
qualifies under the statute, 30 U.S.C. § 24 (1964); Hammer v. Garfield
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tion organized under the laws of the United States, or of any
State or Territory thereof" 5 ° qualifies, and need not show
that its stockholders are citizens. 1 Thus, if a foreign corporation acquires control of a corporation organized in any
American Jurisdiction, the domestic corporation can locate
and hold mining claims in Wyoming for the benefit of the
foreign corporation and its shareholders.
Even alien individual locators are, for all practical purposes, protected pending an "inquest" into their qualfications by or in behalf of the United States in a proper case.
In Sherlock v. Leighton," an adverse proceeding under the
statute,"4 between two conflicting claimants, Sherlock was
the prior locator and Leighton brought the adverse suit against
him when Sherlock attempted to patent his claim. Leighton
won in the trial court, and contended on appeal that the
judgment that he was entitled to the ground in dispute should
be affirmed because Sherlock failed to establish his citizenship. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the absence of
evidence establishing Sherlock's citizenship authorized the
trial court to refuse to award possession to Sherlock, but did
On petition for renot authorize a judgment for Leighton.
hearing, 6 the Court adhered to its decision reversing the
trial court, noting that Sherlock's failure to establish that
he was a citizen was not the equivalent of proof by Leighton
that Sherlock was an alien. 7 Proof of alienage might have

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Mining Co., 130 U.S. 293 (1889), but an ordinary unacknowledged location
certificate, reciting the same facts, would not, since it need not be acknowledged to be recorded. WYO. STAT. § 30-1 (1957). But compare Wyo. STAT.
§§ 34-18 and 34-19 (1957) with Thomas v. Roth, 386 P.2d 926, 930 (Wyo.
1963). The Court in Thomas said that even if acknowledged, an affidavit
is not eligible for recordation because it is not a "deed, mortgage or conveyance" under Wyo. STAT. 34-18 (1957). Although this ignores the
"certificates and instruments" language of Wyo. STAT. § 34-19 (1957), it
is not apparent that the Wyoming Supreme Court would require a location
certificate to be acknowledged before being entitled to recordation. But
caution would suggest that Wyoming claim certificates should be acknowledged, as they are when combined with the affidavit required for lode
claims. Wyo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957).
30 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
Doe v. Waterloo Mining Co., 70 F. 455 (9th Cir. 1895).
Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 297, 63 P. 580, reh'g denied, 9 Wyo. 311, 63
P. 934 (1901). Cf. E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 392-396.
9 Wyo. 297, 63 P. 580 (1901).
30 U.S.C. § 30 (1964).
Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 297, 63 P. 580, 583-584 (1901).
Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 311, 63 P. 934, 934-935 (1901).
Id., 63 P. at 934. This is because it is incumbent upon each party to an
adverse proceeding under 30 U.S.C. § 30 (1964) to show affirmatively his
own title, and where both parties fail to establish such title, the judgment
of the court will be that neither party has title. Slothower v. Hunter, 15
Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36, 38-39 (1906) ; Iba v. Central Ass'n of Wyoming, 5 Wyo.
355, 40 P. 527, reh'g denied, 5 Wyo. 367, 42 P. 20 (1895).
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cleared the record of the prior location so as to entitle Leighton
to a judgment for possession,"8 but even so, the alien could,
apparently, defeat the subsequent claimant by becoming a
naturalized citizen,5" if not by merely declaring his intention
to become a citizen.6"
Wyoming follows the well recognized rule"' that a mining
location may be made by an agent in behalf of his principal,
even without the principal's knowledge, if the principal subsequently ratifies the act, or if there is a local rule authorizing
it."2 Ratification can occur even as late as the trial of an
adverse suit, as in Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 8 where a party was held to have ratified the act of
its agent, even if the agent had no authority originally, when
it offered in evidence and relied upon an additional certificate
of location, signed in its name and recorded by one claiming
to be its attorney. Similarly, one apparently holding the
entire legal title to a location can, by joining others in conveying it, evidence the fact that he holds it partly in their
interest. 4
PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTS OF LOCATION

We can now consider a broad topic which is easily labeled
and readily subdivided into component elements traditionally
set forth in what might be called" the preferred order." What
constitutes the appropriation of public mineral lands is the
topic, and the steps taken by one qualified to make such an
appropriation, usually referred to collectively as the "acts of
location," comprise the elements of a completed appropriation.
Performance of all of the acts of location is required to
perfect the entry and establish the appropriator's right to
possession of the mineral deposit which he has discovered.
It is therefore natural to assume that the acts of location will
follow-rather than precede--the required discovery of a
58. Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 297, 63 P. 580, 584 (1901).
59.

Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 311, 63 P. 934 (1901), relying on Manuel
v. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505 (1894).
60. E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 394, citing Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 116 (1867).
61. See, e.g., E. DE SOTO & A. MoRmisoN, supra note 31, at 61.
62. Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 854 (1908); cf. LeClair v. Hawley,
18 Wyo. 23, 102 P. 853, 859 (1909).
63. 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 684 (1910).
64. Id., 106 P. at 681. In the case cited, however, the locator with the apparent
legal title did not deny that he acted as agent for his co-locators, and the
Court carefully limits its holding to the facts of the case.
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valuable mineral deposit 5 and that the acts of location should
then proceed in a logical order :66 posting of notice; development of the discovery ;"6marking of boundaries, and recording
of the claim.
Indeed, there is good reason, at least with respect to
lode claims," to expect the prospector to follow the preferred
order, since the law contemplates that the discovery of a
lead sufficient to justify further work will precede most
digging and that upon such a discovery the prospector will
post his claim. 9 He will then dig in earnest, and as he
65. "[I]t may be said that discovery should chronologically precede the acts of
location ... ." Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881,
883 (1913).
66. The statutes seem, in fact, to command that the acts of location await
discovery, and that the recording of claims await the performance of
the other acts of location. "[N]o location of a mining claim shall be
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the
claim located." 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964). "Before the filing of a location certificate in the office of the county clerk and ex officio register of
deeds, the discoverer of any lode, vein or fissure shall designate the location
thereof . . . (1) By sinking a shaft . . .; (2) By posting at the point of
discovery . . . a plain sign or notice . . .; (3) By marking the surface
boundaries of the claim . . .; provided, that no right to such lode or claim
or its possession or enjoyment, shall be given to any person or persons,
unless such person or persons shall discover in said claim mineral bearing
rock in place." WYo. STAT. § 30-3 (1957) (emphasis supplied). As to
placer claims, which are "subject to entry . . . under like circumstances and
conditions . . . as are provided for lode claims," 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964), the
discoverer shall locate his claim, "before filing . . . [his] location certificate
: First, by securely fixing upon such claim a notice . . .; second, by
designating the surface boundaries by substantial posts or stone monuments . . . ." Wyo. STAT. § 30-10 (1957). To accommodate these acts, the
Wyoming statutes allow sixty days in which to sink the required shaft,
WYO. STAT. § 30-7 (1957), and record lode certificates. WYo. STAT. § 30-1
(1957). Ninety days is allowed for the recording of placer certificates.
WYO. STAT. § 30-10 (1957).
67. Discovery work is necessary in Wyoming only for lode claims. Compare
Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-3, 30-7 (1957), with WYO. STAT. § 30-10 (1957).
68. See note 67 supra. The absence of discovery work requirements for placer
claims can be explained on either or both of two grounds: (1) Since placer
claims should be laid out "to conform as near as practicable with the United
States system of public-land surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions of
such surveys," 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964), it is unnecessary to determine in advance of marking boundaries how the geological condition of rock in place
dictates laying out one or more dimensions of the claim. Topography and
surficial geology usually control the dimensions and boundaries of a placer
claim. (2) The placer-claim statutes do not contemplate underground
workings at any substantial depth, even after exploration and development
lead to exploitation. Titanium Actynite Industries v. McLennan, 272 F.2d
667 (10th Cir. 1959); see also Sherwood v. Greer, supra note 2, at 24-25.
In those states such as Idaho and Montana, where discovery work is required
for placer claims, the intention is apparently "to demonstrate the good
faith intention of the locator to claim the land for its mineral value and
not for speculative purposes," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.55, at 855
(1963), since the work is specified in terms of "value of labor performed
or minimum excavation in cubic measurement." Id. at nn.25-26.
69. The Wyoming statutes, like the earlier Colorado statutes from which the
Wyoming statutes were apparently taken, specify the sinking of shafts upon
lode claims before the posting of notice. WYO. STAT. §§ 30-3(1) and (2)
(1957) (first enacted in its present form in 1886) ; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 9222-6(1) (a), (b), (c) (1963) (originally enacted in 1874). The more explicit
provisions of Wyo. STAT. § 30-7 (1957), however, indicate that the order
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exposes more mineralization (and, hopefully, the lode itself),
the information necessary to determine the orientation of the
axes of the claim will be developed."
Only then can the
boundaries of the claim be properly marked on the ground
and the location accurately described for the purposes of
constructive notice by recordation."
But this approach
assumes reasonably well-defined surface indications of maineralization, and while it may have suited the needs of pickand-shovel prospectors, the needs have changed. The fact is
that the search for large, non-outcropping, and sometimes
disseminated orebodies dictates a new approach to which we
believe the traditions of the text writers must yield." Since
the courts have not demanded conformity to the preferred
order," we shall also abandon it in favor of the order adopted

by modern prospectors.
specified in Wyo. STAT. § 30-3 (1957) is either accidental or a recognition
of the fact that digging may be necessary at the outset "to identify the
type of location, i.e., lode or placer, by disclosing whether the mineral
appears as rock in place or float rock." 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§ 5.55, at 855 (1963). Whether digging was actually the first step of
prospectors in 1886, when the section was first enacted in approximately its
present form, Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 5, [1886] Wyo. Laws 440,
is problematical; by the turn of the Century, when the Wyoming courts
began to focus upon the problems of oil prospectors, it had become doubtful;
today, it is seldom, in practice, the first step.
70. A lode "mining claim may equal but shall not exceed one thousand five
hundred feet in length along the vein or lode . . . . No claim shall extend
more than three hundred feet on each side of the middle of the vein at
the surface . . .. " 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964) (emphasis added). Compare Wyo.
STAT. §§ 30-24, 30-25 (1957).
71. This is especially true in Wyoming where the width of a lode claim is
limited to 300 feet "on each side of the discovery shaft, the discovery shaft
being always equally distant from the side lines" of the claim. WYO. STAT.
§ 30-25 (1957). Compare WYO. STAT. § 30-1(4) and (5) (1957), which
require the record of a lode claim to indicate "the length of the claim along
the vein measured each way from the center of the discovery shaft, and
the general course of the vein as far as it is known," and "the amount of
surface ground claimed on either side of the center of the discovery shaft
or discovery workings."
72. If we followed the traditional approach, we would first discuss the rights
of a prospector in advance of discovery, then consider what constitutes a
sufficient discovery, and conclude with each of the acts of location in the
order listed in the text, supra, at note 66. Such is the approach adopted
in 1-2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 4.1-6.43 (1960) and in the earlier
treatises. 2 C. LINDLEY, supra note 37, §§ 327-392; E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 21-65; G. COSTIGAN, AMERICAN MINING LAW §§ 40-46,
52-57 (1908); see also C. MARTZ, CASES ON NATURAL RESOURCES 529-587
(1951). Mr. Martz discusses the interest of a locator before and after
discovery separately, id. at 588-594. Professor Bloomenthal, on the other
hand, utilizes the traditional approach. F. TRELEASE, H. BLOOMENTHAL & J.
GERAuD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NATURAL RESOURCES 447-533 (1965).
73. "[W]hile it may be said that discovery should chronologically precede the
acts of location it may follow, instead of preceding, such acts, and will be
held good as against all who have not acquired intervening rights . . . ."
Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881, 883 (1913).
"The statute on its face seems positive in the requirement that the discovery
work be done prior to the filing of the location certificate, but this view
has long since been tempered by judicial decision." Globe Mining Co. v.
Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 382 (1957). Though "location must
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Accordingly, we will postpone our discussion of discovery
and the nature of the locator's interest at various times before
and after discovery until we have considered the acts of location in the order preferred by miners : posting of notice;
recording of the claim; marking of boundaries, and development in anticipation of the hoped-for discovery. No doubt
this places "the cart before the horse," 7 5 but it is the prospector who takes the risk that someone else will subsequently
establish a valid claim superior to his. 6 The law as to the
sufficiency of the performance of the individual acts of location, on the other hand, is unaffected by the order in which
they are accomplished, and our accommodation with the
Twentieth Century disturbs only tradition.7
1.

Posting of Notice

The statutes of some jurisdictions require the notice
posted on a lode mining claim to contain information which
cannot ordinarily be determined until after completion of
rest upon discovery, and will not be complete until a discovery is made, it
is not required, in the absence of intervening rights, that discovery shall
precede the other acts of location. If made prior to any intervening rights,
though subsequent to marking the boundaries and recording the claim, the
location, if otherwise good, will be validated at least from the date of
discovery." Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 854 (1908). See also
1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.49 (1963).
74. It is difficult to decide just what order miners follow in practice, since the
almost simultaneous recording of hundreds of certificates (all bearing the
date of recording as the date of discovery), which is occassionally seen,
leads us to suspect that in such instances recording preceded the posting
of notices (which was probably done as a part of a subsequent boundarymarking program). But such paper locations work an obvious fraud on
the prospector then on the ground, who will find it difficult to prove that
he posted notices first (in the face of the prima facie evidence recorded
in the office of the county clerk and ex officio register of deeds), and we
have therefore selected the more justifiable order in which recording follows
posting. The fact is that a block of claims can be best laid out first in the
office and then in the field. But this fact should not promote the filing of
certificates in the county clerks' office to the head of the list of required
acts of location. The intent to segregate a certain portion of the public
domain should be manifested by acts which appropriate the ground with
such publicity as is due to the rights of third parties working in the field
rather than in the courthouse. See Yosemite Gold Mining Co. v. Emerson,
208 U.S. 25, 31 (1908). See also Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming
Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 678 (1910), where the Court said:
[T]he [posted] notice has no relation to the location certificate, except
that it is to be posted before the filing of the latter .... [T]he require-

ment of our statute as to posting notice is . . . the first step in appropriating... [a "discovered lode"], the purpose of which was to show the
discoverer's intention to claim the vein to the extent described, and to
warn others that it had been appropriated.
75. Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 382 (1957).
76. As occurred in Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908).
77. The treatises, especially 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 5.45-5.80 (1963),
give detailed attention to the various acts of location; our purpose here is
solely to examine some of the features of the Wyoming law pertaining
thereto.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 3 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 2

334

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. III

discovery work."8 In these states, "the posted and recorded
notices are essentially identical and contain detailed descriptions of the land claimed."'" In theory then, posting in such
jurisdictions would have to occur after the discovery work,
if not after marking of the boundaries, and it is difficult to
see how the notice would accomplish its intended function."
But the Wyoming statute"' creates no such problems, and a
notice posted in Wyoming will be sufficient if it gives on-theground publicity to later comers of the prospector's intent
to occupy and hold the ground.8" Such is, in fact, the sole
office of the notice required in Wyoming, which need contain
only "the name of the lode or claim, the name of the discoverer
and locator, and the date of . . . discovery."S5 So it is not
78. E.g., Arizona: Aniz. REV. STAT. §§ 27-202A (1956) (requires length and
width of claim, general course of claim, and distance from discovery point
to each end of the claim). See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.51 at 841844 (1963), which discusses similar statutes of other states, and classifies
the Arizona statute with that of New Mexico, NEW MEX. REV. STAT. § 63-2-1
(1953), which requires only a description of the claim by reference to some
natural object or permanent monument as will identify the claim. The
latter statute, however, is quite different from the Arizona-type statute,
and requires only what 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964) requires of a recorded notice;
no discovery work is necessary to tie the claim to a natural object or
permanent monument, and such a requirement should require little delay
in posting the necessary notice.
79. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.51 at 838 (1963). Idaho requires a preliminary notice, IDAHO CODE §§ 47-602, 47-617 (1947), and, in the case of
lode claims, a duplicate of the location certificate, which must be posted
within ten days. IDAHO CODE § 47-602 (1947). No other state has this sort
of double-notice provision.
80. See note 74 supra.
81. Wyo. STAT. § 30-3(2) (1957). The Federal regulations seem to require
more, 43 C.F.R. §§ 3414.1, 3414.2 (1967), but the Regulations appear to
be directory rather than mandatory. The state statute dates from the
Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 5, [1886] Wyo. Laws 440, and has never
been changed. At one time, however, Wyoming did have an Arizona-type
statute, enacted in the Law of Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, [1869] Wyo. Laws
308, but it was repealed by the Law of Dec. 13, 1873, ch. 17, [1873] Wyo.
Laws 176. The 1869 law provided:
Any person or persons discovering and claiming any . . . lode
shall place a notice of such claim upon such . . . lode, giving thereon
date of discovery, name of lode, direction and boundaries of claims and
the name or names of the person or persons claiming such ledge or
lode ....

From repeal of the 1869 law until the enactment of the present provision
in 1886, Wyoming had no statutory posting requirement.
82. See Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750, 755-756 (1951);
Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining,. Milling & Smelting Co.,
13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385, 387 (1905), holding a very simple notice, which
also contained surplusage as to the length, width, and direction of the
claim, sufficient. Cf. Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co.,
18 Wyo.234, 106 P. 673, 678 (1910).
83. WYO. STAT. § 30-3(2) (1957). The Wyoming placer statute, Wyo. STAT.
30-10 (1957), which dates from the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 9,
1886] Wyo. Laws 441, without significant change [it was modified slightly
by the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 22, [1888] Wyo. Laws 90], specifies
that the notice shall contain "the name of the claim, the name of the locator
or locators, the date of the discovery, and the number of feet or acres
claimed." The latter requirement recognizes that the size of a placer
claim may depend upon the intent of a group of locators. See text at notes
33-34, supra. See also Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750
(1951).
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surprising to find that in Wyoming, as in states with similar
"simple-form" provisions, 4 it has been said that :
In view of the object of the notice, as well under
the statute as by the early custom, it is the universal
rule, where neither the notice or a copy of it is
required to be recorded, that it is to be liberally
construed, and its sufficiency, at least to accomplish
the purpose intended, is a question of fact.
The effect of a sufficient notice is to hold the area posted
for a reasonable period of time during which the discovery
work can be completed and the boundaries marked.8 5 So long
as the ground is actually occupied for these purposes, there
is no apparent reason why the statutes should insist, as they
do, 7 that the persons posting such notice qualify as "discoverers," 8 8 but whether a discovery has been made or not,
the extent to which the posted notice serves to segregate the
surrounding area from competing locations is a matter of
considerable importance, at least to other prospectors.8 9
It is easy enough to conclude that the notice holds up to
the maximum amount of ground allowed by law to one claim,
positioned wherever the prospector's discovery work discloses
that it should be,9" unless the locator limits his freedom to
so position his claim by specifying particular directions and
84. E.g., McNulty v. Kelly, 141 Colo. 23, 27, 346 P.2d 585 (1959).
85. Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673,
678 (1910).
86. Union Mining & Milling Co. v. Leich, 24 Wash. 585, 64 P. 829 (1901); ef.
Ingemarson v. Coffey, 41 Colo. 407, 92 P. 908 (1907); Bergquist v. West
Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910) ; 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF MINING § 5.50 (1963).
87. WYO. STAT. §§ 30-3(2), 30-10 (1957). The latter section, relating to placer
claims, refers to "locators" rather than "discoverer and locator," the term
used in the former section, with reference to lode claims, but since a placer
claim notice must also specify a date of discovery, and the term "locator"
implies a completed location, the effect of the two sections would seem to
be identical. See Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo.
234, 106 P. 673, 679-680 (1910); but see id., 106 P. at 686 (Scott, J., concurring), to the effect that the difference between a discoverer and a
locator is largely one of attitude.
88. See note 87 supra, and Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908), in
which the Court raised no objection to a notice posted in advance of discovery. But discussion of the rights of locators in advance of discovery
must be postponed to a subsequent article.
89. There is a comprehensive discussion of the significance of this point in 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.50 at 832-835 (1963). See also Bergquist
v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 683-684
(1910).
90. Sanders v. Noble, 22 Mont. 110, 55 P. 1037 (1899).
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less-than-maximum distances in his notice,9 and to regard
the time within which he must decide where to position his
claim as limited by the time allowed by the statute92 to mark
the boundaries of the claim.93 But should the same rules apply
where the prospector posts notices for a block of claims numbering from two into the hundreds ? It would seem that the
use of a block of claims, in which each posted notice contains
direction and distance specifications governing dimensions,
is justified under modern conditions, even if such information
is surplusage, 4 but that the unique provisions of the Wyoming
statute95 make it difficult in this situation thereafter to maintain freedom to choose where prospecting will be undertaken.
Once the locator has limited his freedom to select the ultimate
position of his claim, he has also limited his freedom to select
the position of his discovery shaft."9 To the extent, however,
that posted notices define the position to be assumed by the
claims when marked on the ground, they are, from the point
of view of later comers, preferable to an indefinite notice
which claims, in effect, the right ultimately to lay out claim
boundaries anywhere in a 1500-foot radius. Where notices
posted for a block of claims are intended by the locator to
define the ground which can ultimately be included in claims
perfected by him, it is apparent that a well-defined block of
claims specified in posted notices accomplishes much the same
91. Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527 (1885). Compare Wiltsee v. King of
Arizona Mining & Milling Co., 7 Ariz. 95, 60 P. 896 (1900). In Erhardt,
the locator claimed 1500 feet on the lode, and the Court limited him to
750 feet each way from the notice; under the rule of Sanders v. Noble,
22 Mont. 110, 55 P. 1037 (1899), a slightly different wording, such as
"1500 feet from this point on this lode," might have gained greater freedom
in positioning the claim.
92. WYo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957) allows sixty days.
93. Since Wyoming allows sixty days to complete discovery work, WYo. STAT.
§ 30-7 (1957), mark boundaries, Wyo. STAT. § 30-3(3) (1957), and record
the claim, Wyo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957), it is unnecessary to distinguish between
these various acts for this purpose, as it would be in Colorado, for example,
where the locator has three months to record, COLO. REv. STAT. § 92-22-3
(1963), and to mark boundaries, COLO. REv. STAT. § 92-22-6(1) (d) (1963),
but only sixty days to sink a shaft, COLO. REv. STAT. § 92-22-9 (1963).
Colorado, however, now provides an alternative to the discovery shaft, and
apparently allows three months to complete the map which may be filed in
lieu of sinking a shaft. COLO. REv. STAT. § 92-22-6(2) (1963).
94. See note 82 supra, and compare WYO. STAT. § 30-3(2) (1957).
95. WYo. STAT. §§ 30-25 (1957): "The width of any lode claim . . . located
within Wyoming shall not exceed three hundred feet on each side of the
discovery shaft, the discovery shaft being always equally distant from the
side lines of the claim ....

." See Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo.

17, 318 P.2d 373, 382(1957).
96. See note 95 supra. But see Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper
Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 685-687 (1910) (concurring opinion by Scott,
J.), which indicates that the posting of notice may itself limit the locator's
ability to select the position of his discovery shaft.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/2

18

Sherwood and Greer: Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example

1968

WYOMING MINING LAW

purpose as a lesser number of indefinite notices, especially
if the target is an as yet undefined massive orebody buried
at some depth. Furthermore, later comers are much better
advised as to what ground can be safely prospected in the
former case than in the latter. If an indefinite notice is to
be accorded wide privileges, definite notices, each of which
claims a lesser privilege, ought to be accorded a similar effect,
at least to the extent that the locator actively pursues work
on his claims,9 7 since sixty days at most are involved.
Although the notice may be posted anywhere "upon" a
Wyoming placer claim, 98 a lode claim notice must be posted
This latter rule
"at the point of discovery, on the surface."
might be regarded as having been relaxed in the Bergquist
case,... where the author of the opinion held two notices intended to relocate a prior attempted location, the Little Joe,
one on a paper placed in the ridge log of a shaft house, and
one on a wood slab placed on top of the old shaft, sufficient
both as to the manner and as to the place of posting. The
latter resulted from the fact that both the Little Joe locators
and the other parties to the dispute, the Merry Christmas
locators, posted their notice at the same place, fifty and sixty
feet, respectively, from the discovery shafts sunk on the Little
Joe and the Merry Christmas claims. In these circumstances,
it was deemed unnecessary to decide whether the statute requires posting at the point of discovery or at the place where
the discovery shaft is sunk, in the event they are different.
But the concurring opinion in Bergquist11 disagrees on this
point, and would hold a notice posted anywhere other than
at the point selected for the discovery shaft void. Absent any
other authority in Wyoming, the notice should be posted at
the place selected as the discovery point where the discovery
working will be located." 2
97. See Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 855 (1908), to the effect
that the "mere posting of notice" and even marking of the boundaries on
the ground will not prevent peaceable entry by others upon land not actually
occupied or being worked by the first to attempt location.
98. WYO. STAT. § 30-10 (1957). See Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d
677 (1948), where the notices were apparently placed on stakes at the
corners of the various placer claims there involved.
99. WYo. STAT. § 30-3(2) (1957).
100. 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910).
101. Id., 106 P. at 685, 686.
102. But see 1 AMURICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.52 at 846-847 (1963): Point of
discovery "refers to the original discovery of mineral upon the ground, not
to the point where the discovery shaft is later sunk or other development
work is done."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1968

19

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 3 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 2

338

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

2.

Vol. III

Recording of Claim

The function of the record of a mining claim.. is so
similar to that of the posted notice that the tendency of
the prospector to think of the location certificate" simply
as the recorded copy of his posted notice is understandable." 5
But while the notice is intended to give actual notice on the
ground to other prospectors, as we have already seen, the
recorded certificate is intended both to give constructive
notice of the existence and extent of the location0 6 and to
preserve a record of the claim.0 7 Posting a duplicate copy
of the certificate on the ground will, of course, satisfy the
requirements of the Wyoming statutes governing posted
notices,"0 8 but a notice containing just enough to satisfy those
103. The term comes from the Federal statute, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), which
requires that "all records of mining claims made after May 10, 1872, shall
contain the name or names of the locators, the date of location, and such
a description of the claim or claims located by reference to some natural
object or permanent monument as will identify the claim."
104. This term appears in, and is defined by WYo. STAT. §§ 30-1 and 30-10 (1957)
as to lodes and placers, respectively. The location certificate recorded for
a claim is not an affidavit, although an affidavit may be made a part of
such a certificate. See WYO. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) and, as to acknowledgment,
note 49 supra.
105. See, e.g., Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 383-385
(1957), where the Court reports that the plaintiff recorded his location
notices, and subsequently recorded "amended location certificates." The
trial court, upon a finding that the only documents properly recorded were
the amended certificates, faulted the plaintiff on this point. The Supreme
Court held that the recording of location notices is a nullity, but that the
purpose of the recording requirement for location certificates is to give
constructive notice concerning the acts claimed to have been performed.
Where, as the court found in Globe, there was actual notice, the constructive
notice is unnecessary and the defendant cannot raise the defective recording
against the plaintiff. Of course, in some states, the recorded certificate
is a copy of the posted notice. See text at notes 78-79 supra.
106. Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 384 (1957): "[A]
significant function of the record . . . of the certificate is the constructive
notice thereby imparted. . . . * * * [T]he primary purpose of requiring
mining claim location certificates to be recorded is the imparting of permanent constructive notice concerning the acts claimed to have been performed
by the locater."
107. "[L]ocation certificates ... on record . . . [take] the place of the location
notices, rendering proof of the posting of the notices unnecessary as against
. . . adverse claimants." Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co.,
18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 685 (1910). When filed in the office of the county
clerk, the certificate takes the place of the posted notice "for the reason
that the certificate contains, in addition to other data, precisely the same
things which the posted notice is required to contain." ld., 106 P. at 686
(Scott, J. concurring). But see the extraordinary decision in Ross Stegman,
A-30812, G.F.S. (Mining) SO-1967-37 (Nov. 21, 1967), in which it was
held that the posted notice must survive recording of the claim.
108. Compare the requirements of WYO. STAT. §§ 30-1(1), (2), and (3) (1957)
with Wyo. STAT. § 30-3(2) (1957), as to lode claims, and as to placer
claims, compare WYO. STAT. §§ 30-10(1), (2) and (3) (1957) with Wyo.
STAT. § 30-10(5) (1957). In each case, the certificate must contain the
name of the claim, the names of the locators, and the date of location, and
the notice must contain the name of the claim, the names of the locators
(as to lodes, the "discoverers and locators," but see notes 87-88 supra); and
the date of discovery. See also note 107 supra.
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statutes will not qualify for recording as the record of the
Why should this be so ?
claim.'
We think the answer to this question is that the recorded
certificate is intended to replace the boundary markers, as
well as the posted notice, in case any or all of them should
be lost or destroyed,"' as well as to provide constructive
notice, and a detailed description.' is therefore required, in
109. In addition to the information required in the posted notices, the lode
locator must include in his location certificate the following "facts" required
by Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-1(4), (5), and (6) (1957):
The length of the claim along the vein measured each way from
the center of the discovery shaft, and the general course of the vein
as far as it is known;
The amount of surface ground claimed on either side of the center
of the discovery shaft or discovery workings;
A description of the claim by such designation of natural or fixed
object, or if upon ground surveyed by the United States system of
land survey, by reference to section or quarter section corners, as
shall identify the claim beyond question.
Although the present statute carries forward an erroneous substitution of
the word "object" for "objects" which occurred in WYo. STAT. § 2546 (1899),
this statute has not otherwise changed since its adoption in the Law of
Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 15, [1888] Wyo. Laws 87-88, and is not substantially
different from the prior Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 3, [1886] Wyo.
Laws 439, which it replaced. Likewise, in the case of a placer location, the
locator must include in his certificate the following, required by Wyo.
STAT. §§ 30-10(4) and (5) (1957):
The number of feet or acres claimed.
A description of the claim by such designation of natural or fixed
objects as shall identify the claim beyond question.
The placer claimant must also designate his claim "as a placer claim" in
his certificate. WYO. STAT. § 30-10(1) (1957). This statute referred to
"monuments" rather than "objects" when it was first adopted in the Law
of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 9 [1886] Wyo. Laws 441. The substitution was
made in the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 22, [1888] Wyo. Laws 89-90. It
should be noted that "object," as used in the Wyoming statutes, must
include "monuments"; otherwise it would be more restrictive than the
Federal law, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964), which cannot be so restricted. 30
U.S.C. §§ 22, 28 (1964).
110. Once properly set, boundary markers have performed their original office
and their subsequent loss or destruction other than by the locator does not
vitiate the claim. Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677, 685 (1948),
quoting E. DE. SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 60.
111. WYO. STAT. §§ 30-1(6), 30-10(5) (1957). Both lodes and placers are to be
described by such designation of natural or fixed objects as shall identify
the claim beyond question, and in the case of lodes, "by reference to section
or quarter section corners" if the claim is "upon ground surveyed by the
United States system of land survey," Wyo. STAT. § 30-1(6) (1957), and
"any certificate of the location of a lode claim which shall not fully contain
all the requirements named in . . . [WYo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957)], together
with such other description as shall identify the lode or claim with reasonable certainty, shall be void." WYO. STAT. § 30-2 (1957). Furthermore, "no
location certificate shall contain more than one claim or location, whether
the location be made by one or more locators, and any location certificate
that contains upon its face more than one location claim shall be absolutely
void, except as to the first location named and described therein, and in
case more than one claim or location is described together so that the first
one can not be distinguished from the others, the certificate of location
shall be void as an entirety." WYO. STAT. § 30-5 (1957). Both statutes just
quoted are substantially unchanged from their original enactment in the
Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 116, §§ 4, 16, [1886] Wyo. Laws 439, 445. But
these requirements are, for all practical purposes, no different than the
requirement found in 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). The addition of the language
referring to the United States system of land surveys, in the case of lodes,
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addition to the information found in the posted notice."2 The
prospector, however, often seems to be primarily interested
in preserving the posted notice of his claim, and he therefore
hastens to record it, without regard to the other function
of the record, which is to inform all concerned where"' and
how" 4 the claim has been located."' But if the prospector
records a certificate which accomplishes both functions, his
haste to record is justified by the practical advantages of
proof which the record offers, in case of dispute, over
other kinds of evidence." 6 So what does it matter that
a complete certificate is recorded before the boundaries are
marked on the ground?"' If the boundaries are marked, in
conformity with the description contained in the certificate,
within the time allowed by law, and before the initiation of an

112.
113.
114.

115.
116.

117.

is in accordance with 30 U.S.C. § 34 (1964): "The description of vein or
lode claims upon surveyed lands shall designate the location of the claims
with reference to the lines of the public survey, but need not conform
therewith." Placer claims, however, shall conform to the legal subdivisions
of the public lands, where surveyed, and "shall conform as near as practicable" with the system of public-land surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys, unless this cannot be done. 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
Strictly construed, these Federal statutes relate to surveys for patent, rather
than location procedures, but the Wyoming statutes, by requiring attention
to these details upon location, facilitate surveys and patenting as well as
the desired constructive notice. Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3414.1 (1967).
See notes 108 and 109 supra. See also Masek v. Ostlund, 358 P.2d 100,
103-104 (1960), with respect to discrepancies between the boundaries as
staked and as described in location certificates.
See note 111 supra.
"The length of the claim along the vein measured each way from the center
of the discovery shaft, and the general course of the vein as far as it is
known," Wyo. STAT. § 30-1(4) (1957), and "the amount of surface ground
claimed on either side of the center of the discovery shaft or discovery
workings," Wyo. STAT. § 30-1(5) (1957), must be given. Compare Wyo.
STAT. § 30-25 (1957). In accordance with these statutes, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held, in Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36, 39
(1906), that a certificate "is fatally defective and void" where it fails to
give the required lengths or to mention the discovery shaft at all, and that
the claim falls with it. But see Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper
Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 677 (1910), involving the same certificate,
where it was held that the imperfect certificate was not absolutely void,
since it could be amended, and when so amended, "the amendment takes
effect with the original as of the date of the latter." Id. (Emphasis added).
As to placer claims, WYO. STAT. § 30-10 (1957) requires that the "number
of feet or acres" claimed must be stated. This requirement serves the same
function as the provisions of Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-1(4) and (5) (1957) just
discussed serve for lode claims.
See Note, The Description of a Mining Claim, 9 WYo. L.J. 224 (1955) ; Cf.
Moran, Procedurein Locating and Patenting a Mining Claim, 14 Wyo. L.J.
123, 131 (1960).
Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957). But cf.
Masek v. Ostlund, 358 P.2d 100, 104 (1960) (Harnsberger, J., dissenting),
where it is pointed out that "where there is conflict between markings on
the ground and description in the recorded location notice, the markings
control, if they can be definitely located or their location can be clearly
ascertained. (Emphasis by Harnsberger, J.)
Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 882 (1957). See
also the other cases cited in note 73 8upra.
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intervening right, no one is prejudiced.11 But this does not
mean that the certificate should substitute for the other acts
of location which, if done with the diligence required by law,
serve to give actual notice of occupation and appropriation.
In sum, neither the constructive notice nor the preserving
of a record of a claim, for which the statutes provide, serves
the function of actual notice which the law requires on the
ground when the appropriation is being initiated." 9 This,
we submit, is why the Wyoming statutes condition the right
to record on the giving of actual notice by completion of the
other acts of location. 20
So understood, and assuming that the rush to record is
not an effort to defeat a prior appropriator through the device
of a "paper" location, the prospector's natural tendency to
record his claim as early as possible can be harmonized with
the statutes, provided that his certificate contains the required
information without which it is, and should be, void. 2 ' That
the courts occasionally seem to temper the harshness of the
rule through liberal construction in favor of a good-faith
locator is merely recognition of the fact that what constitutes
a sufficient certificate depends upon the circumstances present in each particular case.' A liberal construction does not,
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.

Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co.,
13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385, 387 (1905).
See note 82 supra.
"'[W]here there is actual notice, constructive notice becomes unnecessary.' "
Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 386 (Wyo. 1960),
quoting Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 384 (1957).
Cf. note 66 supra as to the statutory condition.
See note 114 supra.
See, e.g., Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750 (1951). This
was a quiet title action brought by a senior locator to quiet title to ground
subsequently claimed by a junior locator. The defendant junior locator
claimed that the plaintiff's prior location was void for insufficient description of the land, failure to state the number of acres claimed, and failure
to state the name of the claim. The facts showed that the plaintiff had
apparently filed a location certificate in a timely fashion but had omitted
the name of the claim and had described the claim as "S.E.4 NE4 NE4 S.E.
21 N.W. 4 S.W. 22 Section 22-21." The certificate further stated that the
claim was to be known as the Bentonite Placer Mining Claim. Notwithstanding this recital in the certificate, the name of the claim given in the
posted notice was "Little Side" or "Little Cycle." In affirming a judgment
for the plaintiff senior locator, the Court said that the location was merely
defective and was cured as to the subsequent locator. The description, the
Court said, was incorrectly recited but nevertheless was reasonably decipherable. Further, the defective designation of the ground by legal subdivisions
was cured by a correct statement of the description in an assessment work
affidavit filed by the plaintiff. The Court found that at any rate the
defendant knew and understood what was meant by the description. It
further appeared that the description of the ground was cured by an
amended certificate filed subsequent to the defendant's location of the
same ground. The amended certificate (referred to by the Court as an
amended location notice) claimed the Little Side and asserted claim to
120 acres of ground with a proper description. The Court stated that the
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after all, interfere with the rights of a second prospector who
had, or should have had, notice of the prior location, either
by actual notice through the performance of the other acts
of location or by constructive notice of record.12
3.

Marking of Boundaries

The Federal statute requires simply that a mining claim
"must be distinctly marked on the ground so that its boundaries can be readily traced.'. 2 4 It would seem from this
that claims must be physically segregated from the public
domain and that other prospectors are entitled to know what
ground is already appropriated." In the case of lode claims,
of course, claim boundaries define considerably more than
the surface acreage appropriated for mining purposes.'26 The
emphasis on ability to "trace" the boundaries is reason enough

123.

124.

125.
126.

defects in the original were not such as to make it void and that the
amended certificate, which was not, in this case, filed for the purpose of
taking in new ground, therefore related back to the original certificate
even in the face of the intervening location of the defendant. See also
Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948).
"Of course, each case must be determined on its own facts; and a locator
who fails to record his location certificate inevitably imperils his rights
to the claim as against any subsequent innocent person who is not informed
either actually or constructively of the location." Globe Mining Co. v.
Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 385 (1957) (emphasis added).
30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964). As to placer claims, the Wyoming statute supplementing the Federal statute is equally simple: "[T]he discoverer shall
locate his claim . . . by designating the surface boundaries by substantial
posts or stone monuments at each corner of the claim." Law of Mar. 3,
1888, ch. 40, § 22, [1888] Wyo. Laws 90; WYo. STAT. § 30-10(5) (1957).
The earlier Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 9, [1886] Wyo. Laws 441-442,
provided that "the discoverer shall locate his claim . . . by designating the
surface boundaries by substantial posts, one at each corner of the claim.
In localities where timber cannot be found, or where such corners or angles
are of rocky surface, such monuments may consist of mounds of stone three
feet high and three feet at the base." The 1886 provision is similar to
the present provision for lode claims found in WYO. STAT. § 30-3(3) (1957)
which, although it dates from the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 17, [1888]
Wyo. Laws 88, differs very little from the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115,
§ 5, [1886] Wyo. Laws 440. Wyo. STAT. § 30-3(3) (1957) provides that
the surface boundaries of lode claims "shall be marked by six substantial
monuments of stone or posts, hewed or marked on the side or sides, which
face is [in?] toward the claim, and sunk in the ground, one at each corner,
and one at the center of each side line, and when thus marking the boundaries of a claim, if any one or more of such posts or monuments of stone
shall fall, by necessity, upon precipitous ground, when the proper placing
of it is impracticable or dangerous to life or limb, it shall be lawful to
place any such post or monument of stone at the nearest point properly
marked to designate its right place."
Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673,
680 (1910); see also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.64, at 875 (1963).
See 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), and compare 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964). The extralateral right accorded to lode claims in Section 26 has its parallel in Wyo.
STAT. § 30-8 (1957), and both Section 23 of the Federal law and Wyo. STAT.
§§ 30-1(4), 30-1(5), 30-24, 30-25 (1957), include specific length and width
provisions for lode claims. Since "the end lines of each [lode] claim shall
be parallel to each other," 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964), the marking requirements
are of particular importance where lode claims are concerned. Cf. 43 C.F.R.
§§ 3411.3-3411.5, 3412.1 (1967).
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for the general rule that, in case of discrepancy, the monuments as located on the ground control over the description
found in the recorded location certificate." 7 But how can
we explain the equally well-recognized rule that obliteration
of boundary markings will not vitiate the constructive notice
provided by the record of a location ?..S The answer is that
this rule cannot be explained, unless we distinguish between
the two functions of marked boundaries.
A cursory examination of the cases would indicate that
the principal purpose of the boundary marking requirement
is to give actual notice to other prospectors of the position
and extent of the location.!29 This notice function is important, but the tendency of the courts to adopt a liberal construction of the statute in order to protect prior good-faith
locators 3 ' in cases involving obliterated markings3 . and discrepancies between boundaries as marked on the ground and
as described of record"5 2 has caused prospectors to conclude
that the marking of boundaries is simply one of the acts of
location which evidence the locator's intent to appropriate
public lands and that the designation. 8 of a location, so
important to the initiation of private rights on the public
127. See, e.g., Masek v. Ostlund, 358 P.2d 100 (Wyo. 1960); cf. 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF MINING § 5.69 (1963). As to discrepancies between patented claim monuments and the calls in the patents, the same rule prevails by statute. 30
U.S.C. § 34 (1964).
128. E.g., Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750, 755-756 (1951);
Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677, 685 (1948); Slothower v.
Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36, 41 (1906).
129. Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750 (1951); Scoggin v.
Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d 677 (1948); ef. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§ 5.64, at 875-876 (1963) and Masek v. Ostlund, 358 P.2d 100 (Wyo. 1960).
130. The good faith of the locator is of utmost importance. Courts will refuse
to extend the protection of the rule to prior locators where there is little
or no evidence that the boundaries were ever marked. See, e.g., Vevelstad
v. Flynn, 16 Alaska 83, 230 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'g Flynn v. Vevelstad, 14 Alaska 557, 119 F. Supp. 93 (D. Alaska 1954).
131. See the cases cited in note 128 supra.
132. E.g., Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957). In
this case, the Court considered the adequacy of the marking of boundaries
by the plaintiff. Relying on evidence that the defendant knew generally of
the plaintiff's claims; that he had access to public records and consulted
them; that the records disclosed the boundaries of the plaintiff's claims
with reasonable certainty, and that the defendant had in fact found the
boundaries on the ground, even though the recorded location notices showed
discovery monuments located elsewhere than at the actual site of the discovery shafts, the Court said that the plaintiff, having actual knowledge
of boundaries, was in no position to raise any question of defective marking.
133. This is the term used in Wyo. STAT. § 30-3 (1957). In WYO. STAT. § 30-10
(1957), the term "locate" is used instead. It is significant that in some
states, at least, placer claims need not be marked if they conform to the
public-land system of surveys. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.64 at
876 (1963); but see id. § 5.63, at 869. Clearly, substantial compliance with
Wyo. STAT. § 30-10(5) (1957) is necessary. Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206,
189 P.2d 677 (1948). In Scoggin, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant
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domain, is not a continuing obligation. This may be so, insofar
as most placer mining claims are concerned,13 ' but as to lode
mining claims, at least, such a conclusion overlooks the other
function of distinctly marked boundaries which has nothing
to do with notice-actual or constructive-and which is in
some ways more important.'
The location of an irregular tract [that is, a tract which
does not conform to subdivisions of the public-land survey
system] as a mining claim, whether lode or placer, segregates
that land from the public domain and, for mining purposes,
appropriates both the land and the mineral deposit' 86 as well.
Because the monuments on the ground control both the appropriation and the extent to which an irregular portion of the
public domain may be segregated and thereby withdrawn from
other locations, entries, reservations, classifications, and withdrawals, the monuments identify the claim not only as against
other prospectors but also as against the United States;
without them, there may be no claim against the owner of
the paramount title.'37 In other words, although the recorded
location certificate may serve as constructive notice against
other prospectors, it is not equivalent to an appropriation
"distinctly marked on the ground so that its boundaries can
be readily traced"' which can be maintained against the
United States." 9 It is, therefore, simply not true, as many
miners assume, that the boundary markings of all mining

134.
135.
136.

137.
138.
139.

had not properly located his claims with reference to the Government survey
because his posts were set near but not exactly on the Government corners.
The Court answered this objection by saying that boundary posts set close
to government markers are, in effect, on the Government corners. It
appeared in this case that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
boundaries of the defendant's claims. The Court emphasized that in any
event the plaintiff's actual knowledge prevented him from relying on any
defect in the marking of defendant's boundaries.
See 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1964), and compare 30 U.S.C. § 34 (1964). Cf. note
133 supra, and Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750, 757
(1951). See also 43 C.F.R. § 3416.5 (1967).
See note 126 supra.
The mineral deposit may "extend outside the vertical side lines of . . .
surface locations." 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). The "exclusive right of possession
and enjoyment of all of the surface included within the lines of . . . locations," granted by Section 26 of the Federal mining law, has been modified,
as to claims located or validated after July 23, 1955, by 30 U.S.C. §§ 612,
613 (1964). Section 612(a) provides that mining claims "shall not be
used, prior to issuance of patent therefor, for any purposes other than
prospecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident
thereto."
See Converse v. Udall, 262 F. Supp. 583 (D. Ore. 1966); United States v.
Independent Quick Silver Co., 72 Interior Dec. 367 (1965).
30 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
See note 137 supra. See also Masek v. Ostlund, 358 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.
1960) (Harnsberger, J., dissenting).
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claims become unimportant at the instant a location certificate is recorded. This in itself, we believe, is sufficient reason
to replace lost boundary markings, at least as often as annual
labor is performed.1 4
It has been said that constructive notice is the equivalent
of actual notice to other prospectors of the existence and
extent of a mining claim. 4 ' If this is so, then either the one
or the other will suffice for notice purposes, and constructive
notice will be unnecessary where there is actual notice; conversely, where there is constructive notice, actual notice will
be unnecessary. To the extent that the description in the
recorded certificate coincides with the actual boundaries as
marked on the ground, at least as to lode claims, there is no
problem. But where the two are not identical, and the boundaries as marked on the ground are obliterated, nothing
remains to serve as actual notice in the place of constructive
notice which turned out to be inaccurate. The locator should
therefore distinguish between the evidence of his location
and the notice of his location. The boundary markers constitute the primary evidence' 4 2 for which nothing else provides
an equivalent substitute; the secondary evidence afforded by
a recorded certificate is just that, and nothing more.
4. Development in Anticipation of Discovery
"The width of any lode claim located within Wyoming
shall not exceed three hundred feet on each side of the disAMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.68 (1963). If the locator continues to
represent his claim from year to year after location, the performance of
the required annual labor takes over many of the actual notice functions
performed at the outset by the acts of location. But annual labor, whether
performed on or off the claim, is no substitute for identification of the
ground segregated by location. But compare Hagerman v. Thompson, 68
Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750, 757-758 (1951), where the Court indicated that
a faulty description can be corrected in an affidavit of annual labor.
141. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 386 (Wyo.
1960), quoting Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373,
384 (1957). It is true that marking boundaries serves much the same
function as the posted notice, which need not contain a definitive description,
and that the record of a location does contain a description which can
substitute for lost boundary markers for purposes of constructive notice.
See text at notes 110-112 supra.
142. What constitutes sufficient marking is a much-litigated topic, 1 AMERICAN
LAW Op MINING § 5.66 (1963), and Scoggin v. Miller, 64 Wyo. 206, 189 P.2d
677 (1948), is a typical case. In Scoggin, the plaintiffs contended, among
other things, that the requirement of Wyo. STAT. § 30-10 (1957) for "substantial posts" had not been met. It appeared that the actual posts used
by defendant's predecessors were four-by-four timbers thirty inches long.
The Court approved these posts as "substantial," saying that any state-law
requirement for posts-such as minimum size-is likely to be an unreasonable invasion of Federal law, and, as such, invalid. The Court held that
the state statute on the size of posts is directory rather than mandatory.

140. See 1
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covery shaft, the discovery shaft being always equally distant
from the sidelines of the claims."' 43 Since it has been held that
one claimant may take advantage of another's failure to place
discovery workings midway between the designated sidelines,
insofar as the sideline farthest from the discovery workings
is concerned,1 4 4 this unique 4 5 provision of Wyoming law,
whether justified or not, 146 must be kept in mind throughout
the performance of the acts of location. 4
Furthermore,
characterizing this provision of the Wyoming statutes as
unique does not mean that it is completely unwarranted, since
the Federal law expressly provides that "no [lode] claim
shall extend more than three hundred feet on each side of
the middle of the vein at the surface." 14 8 If the middle of
the vein at the surface should lie along the long center-axis
of the claim, 49 there is no reason that the state cannot require
the discovery shaft to be on the middle of the vein at the
surface. If there is, instead of a vein appearing at the surface, buried "rock in place bearing ... valuable deposits""'
of minerals, the state statute merely requires what the Federal
148. Wyo. STAT. § 30-25 (1957). The limitation measured from the discovery
shaft dates from the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 2, [1886] Wyo. Laws
439, although adopted in its present form in the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch.
40, § 14, [1888] Wyo. Laws 87. No such limitation appeared in the Law
of Dec. 2, 1869, ch. 22, § 7, [1869] Wyo. Laws 309, which was repealed by
the Law of Dec. 13, 1873, ch. 17, § 1, [1873] Wyo. Laws 176. The 1869 law
did provide: "Claim owners shall be allowed one hundred feet of the surface
on each side of their ledge or lode . .. ."
144. Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 382 (1957): "[I]n
no instance may a claim extend to more than 300 feet from the center point
between the side lines. A deviation of the discovery shaft from the original
center point cannot alter the position of the side line closest thereto, but
automatically delimits the position of the other side line to a point 'equally
distant' from the discovery shaft. * * * Plaintiff must lose that part of his
claim which is in excess of the amount allowed by the statute."
145. Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 382 (1957).
146. "[N]o useful purpose exists for the equidistance rule and . . . it creates
constant confusion and difficulty to the miner . . . . [L]egislative reappraisal of this particular provision is long overdue." Moran, Procedure
in Location, and Patenting a Mining Claim, 14 WYo. L.J. 123, 130 (1960).
147. See Slothower v. Hunter, 15 Wyo. 189, 88 P. 36, 39 (1906), in which a
location certificate was held "fatally defective and void in that it fails
to . . . mention the discovery shaft at all . . . . [T]he failure to so state
renders the certificate void." Compare Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming
Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673 (1910), involving an amendment of
the same certificate following the decision in the Slothower case.
148. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964).
149. See E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supnra note 31, at 18-19, and compare United
States v. George A. Relyea, GFS (Mining) BLM-1967-49 (Idaho Contest
011843, Sept. 26, 1967). But see 1 AmERiCAN LAW OF MINING § 5.17 at 756
(1963). Cf. note 151 infra.
150. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964).
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law seems to contemplate: exposure of a mineral deposit
in place on the long center-axis of a lode claim."'
Exposing rock in place bearing valuable mineral deposits
within the boundaries of a lode claim is by definition antecedent to the perfection of the claim by discovery within the
limits thereof, and regardless of where this must occur, it
must occur.'5 2 So the discovery-work requirement creates
but little burden on the prospector, unless a discovery can
be established at the surface.' 5 3 Even in the latter case, however, some work is ordinarily necessary to show that the
discovery is of rock in place," ' and it is, therefore, neither
surprising nor unusual to find that the discovery-work requirement exists only with respect to lode claims.'
Once it is understood that the purpose of the discoverywork requirement is to establish the discovery of valuable
mineral deposits in place,"' it is not difficult to define the
151. See note 149 supra, and compare 43 C.F.R. § 3411.4 (1967). But see United
States v. Arizona Manganese Corp., 57 Interior Dec. 558 (1942), involving
a "blanket lode," in which the Interior Department permitted a drill hole
discovery on the side lines between two claims to sustain not just one but
both claims.
152. Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co.,
13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385, 386 (1905); Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21
Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881, 882 (1913). See also infra at notes 187-188.
153. Although discovery of ore "at the 'grass-roots'" is not impossible, it is
more likely that a surface "discovery" will be either float-rock insufficient
to justify a lode claim for rock in place or a placer deposit. See 1 AMERIcAN
LAW OF MINING § 4.24, at 629 (1960); of. id., § 4.23.
154. This is because the Wyoming statutes are specific in requiring that a shaft
be sunk "upon the discovery lode or fissure," WYO. STAT. §§ 30-3(1), 30-7
(1957) ; that an "open cut ... shall cut the vein," WYO. STAT. § 30-6 (1957);
that a tunnel "on the vein . . . shall cut the vein," id., and that at least one
drill-hole "in lieu of a discovery shaft, tunnel or pit" shall, "in the course
thereof, . . . cut or expose deposits of valuable minerals . . . ." WYO. STAT.
§ 30-6(2) (1957). The latter statute, however, seems to recognize the fact
that whether a drill hole has in fact cut a vein or rock in place is not
readily determined unless a core-drill is used. See Note, Placer or Lode and
First Locator Protection, 15 Wyo. L.J. 176, 177 (1961). But since Wyo.
STAT. § 80-6 (1957) relates only to lode claims, the drill-hole statute must
also contemplate exposure of rock in place.
155. See notes 67 and 68 supra.
156. See Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 387 (Wyo.
1960), and 1 AMEMCAN LAW OF MINING § 5.55 (1963). The latter also
discusses some of the other purposes served by discovery work. Although
the Wyoming statute does not contain the more explicit requirement of the
Colorado statute, COLO. REv. STAT. § 92-22-6(1) (b) (1963) (emphasis
added), that the discovery shaft must be sunk "upon the lode to the depth
of at least ten feet from the lowest part of the rim of the shaft at the
surface, or deeper, if necessary to show a well defined crevice," the mere
completion of discovery workings to the minimum required dimensions,
without exposure of the necessary mineral deposit in place, is not sufficient.
See Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo.
1960), and Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957).
The Globe case makes it clear that a shaft sunk to the required depth need
only expose the deposit, but avoids determining, as to open cuts, or pits,
whether WYO. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) requires, in addition to exposure, that
an open cut or pit "shall cut the vein ten feet in length." There is, however,
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ways in which this can be done under state law157 within the
sixty days allotted for this work. 5 ' It is, however, more
as the Court recognized, no ambiguity in the requirement that an open cut
or pit shall have a "face ten feet in height." Wyo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957).
While tunnels must "cut the vein ten feet below the surface, measured
from the bottom" of the tunnel, the "tunnel on the vein ten feet in length"
language of Wyo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957), although ambiguous, would seem to
mean that if the tunnel is ten feet long, it will be enough if the vein is
cut or exposed. The parts of WYo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) so far discussed date
from the Law of Mar. 6, 1888, ch. 40, § 18, [1888] Wyo. Laws 88, without
change. The questions discussed in Globe probably would not have arisen
under the earlier Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 5, [1886] Wyo. Laws
440, which provided "that any open cut, or cross cut, or tunnel, which shall
cut a lode at the depth of ten feet at least below the surface, shall hold
such lode the same as if a discovery shaft were sunk thereon, or an adit
of not less than ten feet along the lode from the point where such lode
may be in any manner discovered, shall be equivalent to a discovery shaft."
The 1888 law corrected the adit-tunnel ambiguity of the 1886 law, but
expanded the open-cut exposure requirement to ten feet while creating
the present ambiguity as to the length of exposure required in a tunnel.
The various holdings in Globe as to discovery work may be summarized as
follows: The exposure of rock in place bearing valuable mineral deposits in
the required discovery workings is mandatory, but if that requirement is
met, a "substantial compliance" test will be applied in determining whether
the workings satisfy the prescribed dimensions.
157. The discovery-work requirement dates from the Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch.
115, § 5, [1886] Wyo. Laws 440, and is found in Wyo. STAT. § 30-3(1)
(1957): "Before the filing of a location certificate . . ., the discoverer of
any lode, vein or fissure shall designate the location thereof . . . by sinking
a shaft upon the discovery ["discovered" in the original enactments;
changed in Wyo. STAT. § 2548(1) (1899)] lode or fissure to the depth of
ten feet from the lowest part of the rim of such shaft at the surface." It
makes little difference what the workings are called if they are in fact
"shafts." Compare Bergquist v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18
Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 685 (1910) (" 'location shaft' . . . and 'location' . . .
[are] to be understood as . . . meaning . . . discovery shaft") with Globe

Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957), where it was
deemed important to identify workings as shafts rather than pits. Cf. note
156 supra. WYo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) was amended by the Law of Feb. 11,
1955, ch. 88, § 1, [1955] Wyo. Laws 77-79, to create an optional right in
the discoverer of a mineral deposit located as a lode to drill a hole or holes,
not less than 1% inches in diameter, aggregating at least fifty feet "in
depth," no one of which "shall be less than ten (10) feet in depth" in lieu
of the discovery shaft, tunnel or "pit" otherwise required by law. Wyo.
STAT. §§ 30-6(1)., 30-6(2) (1957). The reasons for enactment of such a
statute, the provisions of which are outlined in Note, 9 Wyo. L.J. 220, 222
(1955), are discussed in Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355
P.2d 377, 387-388 (Wyo. 1960), which dealt, however, only with the last
paragraph of the 1955 law, relating to the filling of pits dug before the
effective date of the law and the drilling of holes in lieu thereof by one
desiring to avail himself of the provisions of the new law. Cf. note 177 infra.
158. "The discoverer of any mineral lode or vein in this state shall have the period
of sixty days from the date of discovering such lode or vein in which to
sink a discovery shaft thereon, or to make the open cut equivalent to such
discovery shaft, or to drill the hole or holes . .. provided [for in Wyo. STAT.
§ 30-6 (1957)]." WYO. STAT. § 30-7 (1957), as amended by Law of Feb. 11,
1955, eh. 88, § 2, [1955] Wyo. Laws 79. The 1955 amendment added the
references to open cuts and drill holes to this provision of the Wyoming
law, which has itself had a checkered history. As originally enacted in the
Law of Mar. 12, 1886, ch. 115, § 7, [1886] Wyo. Laws 440, ninety days were
allowed, and this provision was carried forward in the Law of Mar. 6, 1888,
ch. 40, § 19, [1888] Wyo. Laws 88, Section 15 of which, id. at 87, changed
the time within which location certificates should be recorded in the county
clerk's office to ninety days from the three months allowed by the Law of
Mar. 12, 1886, eh. 115, § 3, [1886] Wyo. Laws 439. The time in which to
do discovery work was extended 120 days by the Law of Jan. 9, 1891,
ch. 46, § 2, [1890-1891] Wyo. Laws 180, along with the time in which to
record. Id. § 1, at 179. Both periods were reduced to the present sixty
days by the Law of Feb. 21, 1895, ch. 108, §§ 1-2 [1895] Wyo. Laws 246-247.
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important to distinguish discovery-work from the required
discovery itself, and to examine some of the difficulties
created by the Wyoming "drill-hole" law enacted in 1955.'
A prospector may dig a pit on a mining claim merely to
show possession, without expectation of a discovery therein, i" °
even where such a pit is not required by statute,"' but he
should not confuse discovery work with discovery,16 just as
he should not confuse discovery work with assessment work. 6 '
The casual reader of Phillips v. Brill,' for example, may conclude that one drill hole, shaft, or cut is sufficient to satisfy
the discovery work requirement for two adjacent claims. In
that case, however, the owmers of two adjoining association
oil placer claims made a discovery in a well which they had
commenced upon the boundary line between their claims, 6 '
only one of which was involved in the case. The Court discussed, without deciding, whether one well could be used to
validate two placer claims on the basis of a discovery made
therein ;16 but it did not assume, as the reader might, that
Had
discovery workings are required on placer claims.'
the Brill case involved adjacent lode claims instead, the discovery made in a hole bisected at the surface by the common
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.

167.

See note 157 supra.
As occurred in Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 855 (1908).
As on placer claims. See notes 67 and 68 supra.
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.55 (1963).
See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 7.4 (1960). Like assessment work, however, the discovery work requirement is intended, among other things,
to evidence the assertion of the locator's interest; the amount of work
required is too small to be of any real significance in developing the claim.
Compare Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 297, 63 P. 580, 583 (1901), with 1
AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.55 at 855 (1963). See also Globe Mining Co.
v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 385 (1957) (locator cannot adopt
work done by others as his own for discovery-work purposes).
17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908). See also the discussion of this case beginning
at note 206 infra.
The difficulty involved in drilling a hole without deviation from the vertical
to any significant depth should dissuade any locator from adopting this
procedure. See, e.g., YOUNG, ELEMENTS OF MINING 79-82 (4th ed. 1946).
The Court does not deny that two claims can be validated by discovery in a
boundary line drill hole, but the decision seems to favor requiring the
locator to elect one claim or the other. Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95
P. 856, 858-860 (1908). But see Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo.
133, 128 P. 881, 882-883 (1913), where the Court does not seem to question
the procedure.
Discovery workings are not required on placer claims. See notes 67 and
68 supra. The owners of the claim involved in Brill did dig a pit ten or
eleven feet deep prior to commencing their drill hole, however, and this
fact confuses the situation in Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856, 857
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end line' 8 of the two claims might have been sufficient to
validate both claims," 9 but the single hole could not have
satisfied the discovery-work statutes then or now,"" even if
the Court refused to infer that the hole deviated from the
vertical in its downward course. 7 ' Half of a discovery shaft
or drill hole hardly satisfies the statutes. 72
The 1955 "drill-hole" law requires from one to five holes
not less than ten feet deep, provided an aggregate depth of
fifty feet is reached. 7 Length is not the criterion; depth is.
One of the holes must be designated as "the discovery hole," 74
and if the prospector chooses to drill such a hole in lieu of
doing some other kind of discovery work, he apparently
obligates himself to monument the hole and post a notice
on the monument." 5 Furthermore, if his drill hole encounters
water, the hole must be plugged, and he must set forth the
facts with respect to the depth at which the water was
encountered, and the plugging back of the hole, in an affidavit
which "shall" be recorded. 7 '
168. So long as the discovery workings of a lode claim are on the long centeraxis of the claim, it does not matter how close the workings are to one
end line or the other, and so long as but one claim is intended to be
benefited thereby, there is ordinarily no reason why the workings cannot
be bisected by an end line. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.58, at 860
(1963).
169. See infra at notes 208-211.
170. See notes 154 and 156 supra.
171. No attempt was made in Brill to prove that the drill hole did deviate from
the vertical, and the Court therefore refused to infer that it did. Phillips
v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856, 859 (1908). A similar result was reached
five years later in Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 128
P. 881, 882-883 (1913), where the Court found it unnecessary to reach the
question of whether two separate discoveries in a boundary-line drill hole
will validate two adjacent claims, since a survey showed that the well was
not on the claim in question at all.
172. See 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF MINING § 5.58, at n.11 (1963); Poplar Creek
Consol. Quartz Mine, 16 Interior Dec. 1 (1893). An attempt to quarter
the discovery workings on a common corner where the end lines of four
lode claims meet would be clearly inadequate for all four claims in view
of WYO. STAT. § 30-25 (1957) which requires discovery shafts to be
"always equally distant from the side lines of the claims."
173. WyO. STAT. § 30-6(2) (1957).
174. WYo. STAT. § 30-6(3) (1957): "[I]n the event that more than one such hole
shall have been drilled."
175. WYO. STAT. § 30-6(3) (1957) provides as follows:
The discoverer shall designate one of the holes thus drilled as the
discovery hole, in the event that more than one such hole shall have
been drilled. The said hole shall be marked by a substantial post or
other permanent marker, placed at and adjacent to the hole and within
five feet thereof, firmly fixed in the ground, and extending at least
thirty inches in height above the ground, and on which shall be placed
the name of the claim, the owner thereof, the depth of the hole, and
the date of the drilling thereof.
Since designation of a discovery hole is necessary only in the event that
there is more than one hole, it is not clear that monumenting and posting
is required where there is but one hole.
176. WYo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957). Cf. note 177 infre.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss2/2

32

Sherwood and Greer: Mining Law in a Nuclear Age: The Wyoming Example

1968

WYOMING MINING LAW

Under the rationale of the Thurston case,'.. failure to
comply with the requirements of the statute with respect to
drill holes encountering water would not jeopardize the locator's rights to his mining claim, but there is another provision
of the 1955 law 78 which may trap the unwary:
The drilling of such hole, or holes, or the sinking
of the shaft or making of the discovery pit otherwise
provided for in this act [§§ 30-1 to 30-26] shall be
made a matter of record by the recording in the
office of the county clerk of the county in which
the claim shall be situated the affidavit or sworn
statement of the discoverer, locator, owner or his or
their agents stating the date of such work, the
nature thereof, the person or persons by whom performed, the location of such work within the claim,
and the nature of the mineral discovered. Such affidavit may be a part of the location certificate to be
thereafter recorded in accordance with the provisions of this act.
The creation of the rights provided for in this
act are based upon the truth of the statements contained in such affidavit or statement and the certificate of location, herein otherwise provided for, and
177. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 387-388 (Wyo.
1960). This case considered an alleged failure to comply with the last
paragraph of Wyo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957), which reads as follows:
The owner of any mining claim located prior to the effective date
of this act [§§ 30-1 to 30-26 [an insertion by the Compiler which is
obviously erroneous; "Laws 1955, ch. 88, § 1," is intended]] and who
has performed discovery work may avail himself of the provisions
hereof by making the drill hole or holes herein provided for and filling
any discovery cut previously made, and making and placing of record
the affidavit herein provided for, together with a statement of the
filling of such discovery pit or cut, and that the said work was done
and the affidavit made for the purpose of obtaining the benefits of
this act.
The Court observed that the Legislature provided no penalty for failure to
comply with this provision, noted that mandatory application of the statute
would not serve the objects of the discovery-work requirements, and dismissed as unreasonable the contention that one must comply with this
provision to rely on drill holes to validate claims on which pits were dug
prior to the effective date of the provision. If limited to the facts of the
case, and to the paragraph under consideration, the reasoning of the Court
is correct; any other result would have defeated a locator who had apparently
complied with all applicable discovery-work provisions of the law existing
in 1954 when he performed the work then required and whose only alleged
fault was in not undoing what he had properly done when he went ahead
before adverse location, and drilled holes as he had the right to do without
regard to the new statute. As indicated in the text, the same reasoning
would apply to a failure to comply with the provisions of the 1955 law as
to water-bearing strata, since these have nothing to do with the objects of
the discovery-work requirement of the mining laws. This also "is not a
condition precedent but an incident or regulation prescribing mining
methods or operation on public lands." Western Standard Uranium Co. v.
Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 387 (Wyo. 1960).
178. WYO. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) (emphasis added).
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no rights of any kind or nature shall vest or exist or
be created or arise when any material statement
or representation therein made is false.
These provisions clearly apply even where drill holes are
not used in lieu of the other kinds of discovery workings,
and a prospector not familiar with this sort of statute 7" may
easily overlook the affidavit requirement if he decides neither
to drill nor to read this section of the Wyoming statutes.18

Whether failure to record the required affidavit jeopardizes
more than the constructive notice afforded by an otherwise

adequate recorded location certificate or not,"' it is clear
that failure to complete the required discovery work and to
file the discovery-work affidavit opens the claim to relocation
and evidences the failure to do the work as well.'8 2
179. States with similar statutes are listed and discussed in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING §§ 5.55, at 854-855, and 5.61 (1963).
The New Mexico statute,
N.M. REV. STAT. § 63-2-3.1 (1953), which is otherwise similar to the Wyoming statute, is limited to drill holes.
180. The requirement is, for example, completely overlooked in 1 AMERICAN LAW
OP MINING § 5.61 (1963), where the Wyoming statute is said to be one
which requires that "the fact of drilling must be recorded." Id. at 864
(emphasis added). Similarly, the title of Wyo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) ("When
open cut equivalent to discovery shaft; drilled hole in lieu of discovery
shaft; requirements as to drilled hole") is of little help to the casual reader.
181. See note 177 supra. In effect, the statute makes the filing of an affidavit
of discovery work a part of the required discovery work, and in principle,
at least, there is no reason why failure to record the affidavit should not
have the same effect as failure to do the work would have. But since no
rights are created in the 1955 Act as to any kind of discovery working other
than drill holes, the word "act" in the next-to-last paragraph of WYo. STAT.
§ 30-6 (1957) must be construed to include WYO. STAT. §§ 30-3(1) and 30-7
(1957), as it was by the Compiler in the preceding paragraph, if it is to
be strictly construed either for constructive-notice purposes or for all
purposes. The fact that the word "act," despite the Compiler's conclusion
to the contrary, is obviously used in a different sense in the last paragraph
of WYO. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) is, perhaps, significant, as is the fact that the
Compiler did not even guess at the meaning of the word in the next-to-last
paragraph of the section. It would seem that if discovery work of any
kind other than drill holes is actually done, constructive notice alone should
be affected by a failure to record the required affidavit.
182. A different question is presented where the required discovery work has
been completed but the discovery work affidavit, required by Wyo. STAT.
§ 30-6 (1957), has not been filed. While the Legislature has cast the filing
provision in the mandatory language of "shall," it has not provided a
statutory penalty or result in cases where the mandate is ignored or
neglected by failing to file the affidavit at all. Alternative legal consequences of such failure readily come to mind: (1) Failure to file the affidavit might be deemed a substantial noncompliance with a material condition
of location. If so, the ground claimed should logically be held to be open
to relocation by others for so long as the affidavit remains unrecorded, even
though the discovery work has actually been done. Such a result, although
commendable from the standpoint of giving literal meaning to the mandatory
language used by the Legislature, seems harsh. (2) Failure to file the
affidavit might be deemed either a less-than-substantial noncompliance with
a material condition of location or a failure to take advantage of a provision designed to confer the benefits of constructive notice and prima facie
evidence that the work was done. If so, it would follow that the locator
in the event of contest, might show by other means that third parties had
actual notice of the fact that the work was done. Whether the ground
remained open to relocation by the failure of the first locator to file the
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Sine Qua Non OF A VALID MINING CLAII
Until the discovery of a vein or lode within the limits
and the Wyoming
of a claim, the Federal mining laws,'
85 to prohibit the
4
seen,
have
we
as
appear,
also,"
statutes
location of a lode mining claim. Even though the prohibition
is more apparent than real, it is, however, clear that the
discovery requirement exists, and that it extends to placer
A discovery of a valuable mineral deposit
claims as well.'
is, in fact, absolutely essential to establish the validity of
any lode or placer mining claim.'87
DISCOVERY: THE

In the earliest Wyoming case to consider a question
involving discovery,"ss the Wyoming Supreme Court said:

183.

184.

185.
186.

187.

188.

affidavit would be a question of fact as to which the ultimate burden of
proof should remain on the party asserting forfeiture, even though the first
locator may have lost the statutory benefits of having filed an affidavit.
Such a legal consequence would seem to be more in harmony with the
apparent object of the statute of providing for record evidence of the
performance of the discovery work.
30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964): "[N]o location of a mining claim shall be made
until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located."
The object of this provision "is evidently to prevent the appropriation of
presumed mineral ground for speculative purposes, to the exclusion of bona
fide prospectors, before sufficient work has been done to determine whether
a vein or lode really exists." 43 C.F.R. § 3413.1 (1968).
See note 66 supra and see also WYo. STAT. § 30-1 (1957). Compare Wyo.
STAT. § 30-6(2) (1957): "[T]he discoverer of a mineral deposit may, at his
option, in lieu of a discovery shaft . . . drill or cause to be drilled, a hole,
or holes, . . . at least one of which shall cut or expose deposits of valuable
minerals sufficient in quality to justify a reasonably prudent man in
expending money and effort in further exploration or development." Section
30-6(2) is of fairly recent origin. Law of Feb. 11, 1955, ch. 88, § 1, [1955]
Wyo. Laws 78. Cf. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d
377, 388 (Wyo. 1960), describing this provision as "a definition in aid of
and to be construed with" 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964).
See notes 65-66 eupra.
Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 853 (1908). Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3416.3
(1968); E. DE SOTO & A. MORRISON, supra note 31, at 259-261. But see Van
Horn v. State, 5 Wyo. 501, 40 P. 964, 966 (1895), where the Court quotes
from Gregory v. Pershbaker, 73 Cal. 109, 14 P. 401 (1887), to the effect
that as to placers, there is no condition in the acts of Congress, local laws,
or practices of miners, that requires the discovery of valuable mineral
before the location was made. What is meant, evidently, is that the acts
of location need not proceed in any particular order, and since Van Horn is
both an oil placer case, as to which Congress ratified claims located in
anticipation of discovery, and a criminal case (prosecution for destruction
of a building), it should not be taken literally in this regard. See notes 9
and 45 supra; Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at 11, n.53.
Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 851, 853, 854 (1908). The discovery requirement is precisely the same for placers as for lodes, except
for the additional requirement, as to lodes, that mineral deposits in rock
in place, as opposed to float rock or loose rock and earth, must be disclosed.
See note 188 infra.
Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting Co.,
13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385, 386 (1905). In this case, the Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed a lower-court decision on conflicting evidence, and in describing the conflict in the evidence for and against discovery by a prior locator,
the Court recognized the need for discovery of mineralized rock in place,
rather than loose rock and earth at the surface.
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It is conceded that a discovery of mineral is . . .
necessary . . . . But just what constitutes such a
discovery is often a question. Many definitions of
Whediscovery have been given by the courts ....
ther or not a discovery has been made is always a
question of fact.
Not unnaturally, a good deal of the litigation involving mining
claims has turned on questions of where,1 89 when,' and by
whom'' a discovery may or must be made, and upon the basic
issue of what constitutes a discovery. Cases involving the
latter question, three of which we will discuss in detail, illustrate most of the important concepts.
For most purposes, the question of what constitutes a
discovery arises in disputes between the locator and the owner
of the paramount title; such disputes, which are frequent
today, are beyond the scope of this article.'92 This is not to
189. It is commonplace to read that a discovery must be made within the boundaries of a locator's claim upon otherwise open, unappropriated public
mineral lands. See Columbia Copper Mining Co. v. Duchess Mining, Milling
& Smelting Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385 (1905); Sherwood & Greer, supra
note 2, at 6-12; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING §§ 4.29-4.34 (1960). Dean v.
Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co., 21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881 (1913), is an interesting
example. In that case, the defendant attempted to validate an oil placer
claim by a discovery well drilled just at the quarter-section line which was
the southern boundary line of the claim. A subsequent survey indicated that
the boundary line was incorrectly determined in the first instance, and, as
correctly surveyed, the boundary line was determined to be a few feet to
the north of the defendant's well. In holding for the plaintiff, whose claim
conflicted with that of defendant, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that
the defendant's discovery was invalid because it was located off the claim
as shown by the subsequent accurate survey. Compare Masek v. Ostlund,
358 P.2d 100 (Wyo. 1960). See also Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856
(1908), discussed infra beginning at note 206.
190. A discovery made by a locator within the boundaries of his own claim will
create no rights if, at the time the discovery is made, the locator is trespassing upon ground validly possessed and held by someone with superior
rights. See Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at 6-12, and the cases there
cited.
191. In Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849 (1908), for example, it was
urged that a discovery made in behalf of a stranger upon lands claimed by
another inured to the benefit of the latter, who had not yet made a discovery of his own. The Court rejected this contention, and in view of the
fact that in the reverse situation, where the stranger attempts to adopt
the discovery of a prior locator, relocation is necessary, there is no reason
to question the result in Whiting absent adverse possession. Compare Wyo.
STAT. §§ 30-4 and 30-9 (1957) with 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 5.9, at
n.1 (1963). Whiting was not, in fact, a simple case, since the discovery was
made on a portion of a claim conveyed to a third party by the original
locator after he had conveyed the remainder, before discovery, to another.
The original locator was then employed by the third party, in whose behalf
he made a discovery on the portion of the claim owned by his then-employer.
The Court did not, therefore, find it necessary to determine whether a
discovery by the original locator, absent the conveyance to the third party,
would have inured to the benefit of his first grantee.
192. Hundreds of decisions involving the sufficiency of purported discoveries, as
against the United States, are collected in the looseleaf Gower Federal
Service (Mining), published periodically by the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation, Boulder, Colorado.
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say that the test of a valid discovery as applied by the Federal
Government in determining title to its own property is
irrelevant to the Wyoming miner."' 3 On the contrary, the
rules applied by the Department of the Interior, rightly or
wrongly, are of vital importance to any miner."' But since
they find little or no support in the Wyoming cases involving
disputes between competing prospectors,"' we shall leave
193. The test is the "prudent-man" test which is discussed infra at notes 197-198.
The application of that test to particular factual situations is the subject
of much recent litigation. See note 194 in ra.
194. Contrast, for example, the following Departmental decisions with the subsequent decisions of the Federal Courts overruling each of them: (1) United
States v. Alvis F. Denison, 71 Interior Dec. 144 (1964); Denison v. Udall,
248 F. Supp. 942 (D. Ariz. 1965); (2) United States v. Alfred Coleman,
A-28557, GFS (Mining) SO-1962-4 (Mar. 27, 1962); Coleman v. United
States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), reh'g denied, 379 F.2d 555 (1967),
cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 476 (1967) ; (3) United States v. C. F. Snyder, 72
Interior Dec. 223 (1965); Snyder v. Udall, 267 F. Supp. 110 (D. Colo. 1967)
(appeal pending); (4) United States v. Fred Garula, A-29948, GFS (Mining) SO-1964-32 (June 3, 1964); Garula v. Udall, 268 F. Supp. 910 (D.
Colo. 1967) (appeal pending); (5) United States v. Henault Mining Co.,
73 Interior Dec. 184 (1966) ; Henault Mining Co. v. Tysk, 271 F. Supp. 474
(D. Mont. 1967) (appeal pending). But see, e.g., Adams v. United States,
318 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Converse v. Udall, 262 F. Supp. 583 (D. Ore.
1966) (appeal pending).
195. The fundamental issue in cases such as those cited in note 194 supra is
whether there is any discovery sufficient to validate a claim as against
the United States. In disputes between competing prospectors, the issue is
not whether but when a discovery was made. In the latter case, different
rules apply, such as those mentioned in Columbia Copper Mining Co. v.
Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelter Co., 13 Wyo. 244, 79 P. 385, 386 (1905),
where the Court quoted from 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES 610 (2d ed. 1903), to the
effect that as to lode claims, the discovery of rock in place containing
mineral, "whether it assays high or low," is sufficient, and from Burke v.
McDonald, 3 Idaho 296, 29 P. 98, 101 (1892), to the effect that a discovery
sufficient to validate a claim exists whenever a prospector finds "indications of mineral that he is willing to spend his time and money in following
with the expectation of finding ore; and a valid location of a mining claim
may be made of a ledge deep in the ground, and appearing at the surface,
not in the shape of ore, but in vein matter only." See also Western Standard
Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 382-384 (Wyo. 1960), and compare
Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 233 U.S. 236 (1914). In this
case, which arose in Wyoming, the Government sued to annul homestead
patents and it was in the defendant company's interest to negative both
discovery and the existence of valuable minerals. The evidence showed
that the patentees had stated in affidavits that the lands were sought for
agricultural purposes and that they contained no valuable coal. Relying on
evidence that the district was known generally to contain coal, that the
lands in controversy were situated near an outcrop, and down dip from a
coal-bearing formation, the Court found that the evidence as a whole
afforded a reasonable ground for believing that a considerable territory
in the vicinity could be mined profitably, and that this information was
available to the agricultural patentees. Mr. Justice Van Devanter said, id.
at 249:
There is no fixed rule that lands become valuable for coal only through
its actual discovery within their boundaries. On the contrary, they
may, and often do, become so through adjacent disclosures and other
surrounding or external conditions ....
This case serves to point up the fact that different standards apply in
determining whether lands are mineral and whether a discovery has been
made, depending on whether the conflict is between a mining locator and
an agricultural claimant, a mining locator and another mining locator, or
a mining locator and the United States as owner of the paramount title.
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analysis of Departmental decisions on the subject to other
writers.1 9 6
It will suffice, for our purposes, to say that the "prudentman" test is recognized in Wyoming1. 7 and that mere inference or indications of mineral are not enough.19
These
principles have been applied by the Wyoming Supreme
Court, in modern context, in two carefully-reasoned cases
which rank among the leading American mining decisions
of this Century.
Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson,19 9 was a suit by the Globe
Mining Company to quiet title to ten of its uranium claims
designated Phil Nos. 3 through 12. The defendant, Anderson,
filed a cross-petition to quiet title to five junior and conflicting claims designated the Andria Nos. I through 5. In
September, 1953, the plaintiff's predecessors identified a
radioactive anomaly through the use of an airborne scintilla196. See, e.g., Gray, New Concept of Discovery and Title to Unpatented Mining
Claims, 10 RocKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 491 (1965), and the materials cited
in note 28 supra.
197. Granlick v. Johnston, 29 Wyo. 349, 213 P. 98, 99 (1923), quoting Chrisman
V. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 332 (1905), with approval. Chrisman adopted the
following test set forth originally in Castle v. Womble, 19 Interior Dec.
455, 457 (1894):
[W]here minerals have been found and the evidence is of such
a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in
the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable
prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine, the requirements
of the statute have been met. To hold otherwise would tend to make
of little avail, if not entirely nugatory, that provision of the law
whereby "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States ....

are . . . declared to be free and open to explora-

tion and purchase."
See also United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 240 F. 996 (D. Wyo. 1916), and
compare Wyo. STAT. § 30-6(2) (1957), which requires the disclosure of
"deposits of valuable minerals sufficient in quality to justify a reasonably
prudent man in expending money and effort in further exploration and
development." This provision of the Law of Feb. 11, 1955, ch. 88, § 1, [1955]
Wyo. Laws 78, was compared with 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1964) in Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 382-384, 388 (Wyo. 1960).
198. Granlick v. Johnston, 29 Wyo. 349, 213 P. 98 (1923); Whiting v. Straup,
17 Wyo. 1, 95 P. 849, 854 (1908); Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co.,
21 Wyo. 133, 128 P. 881 (1913). In Dean, the Wyoming court rejected
claims that oil had been discovered where it was demonstrated merely that
shallow holes or wells showed indications of oil in the form of shale seepage
or shale grease. As Judge Riner pointed out, three years later, mere indications do not suffice to constitute a discovery. United States v. Ohio Oil
Co., 240 F. 996 (D. Wyo. 1916). As should be obvious, a location notice
may be "understood as claiming discovery . . . [but] the notice itself is
not evidence of discovery; that fact must be otherwise shown." Bergquist
v. West Virginia-Wyoming Copper Co., 18 Wyo. 234, 106 P. 673, 680 (1910).
Furthermore, "discovery includes the elements of geological formation,
value, and character of the vein matter." Id. at 686 (Scott, J., concurring).
See also Note, Valuable Mineral Discovery, 9 Wyo. L.J. 214 (1955).
199. 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957). This case is discussed at length, in connection with the distinction between lodes and placers, in Sherwood &
Greer, supra note 2, at 16-32. Cf. Note, WYO. L.J. 176 (1961).
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tion counter. Later, samples were taken and the ground
was located. Then in November of that year, discovery pits
were dug on each of the plaintiff's claims. Prior to April
of 1955, some shallow digging was done on the claims numbering 5 thorugh 8 and some material was blocked out for
mining. In May of 1955 the defendant also identified the
anomaly by airborne means. Believing the plaintiff's locations to be defective, the defendant located his Andria claims
over portions of the Phil Nos. 3 through 12. One of the
questions framed by the trial court was whether the plaintiff
had properly complied with the discovery requirement of the
law. On this issue, the trial court found for the defendant,
rejecting plaintiff's evidence of discovery, which was based
on the reading of scintillation and Geiger counters. The
trial court also found that there was insufficient evidence
to show that any samples taken allegedly from Phil Nos. 5,
6, and 8 came from a vein or rock in place. The Supreme
Court reversed in part, finding that there was uncontradicted
testimony that mineral samples were taken from rock in
place in pits on Phil Nos. 5, 6 and 8; the plaintiff was
therefore held to have made a discovery on those claims. But
as to the other claims, the Supreme Court accepted in principle the holding of the trial court that radiometric measurements do not suffice to constitute discovery, and affirmed,
saying :200
[T]here was no evidence of a sampling and
assaying of a vein, lode, or rock in place in Phil
Nos. 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 and, therefore, no
discovery on these claims-unless we recognize the
readings of electrical instruments such as scintillation and Geiger counters as sufficient to support
discovery. This we are reluctant to do, since such
counters while helpful in prospecting for uranium
cannot be relied upon as the only test. For instance,
plaintiff's witness, Grant, testifying about his general investigation on the subject, said that in certain
areas where the background count was high an assay
showed no uranium.... Thus, with the exception of
Phil Nos. 5, 6, and 8, there is no evidence in the
record on which to base discovery of a vein, lode, or
mineral bearing rock in place within the limits of
200. Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson, 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373, 380
(emphasis by the Court).
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any Phil claim. This is required by both the Federal
and Wyoming statutes relating to lode claims, and
plaintiff is obligated to sustain the burden of proof
Plaintiff did not meet this
in that respect. . .
burden as to Phil Nos. 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 by
a presentation of competent evidence showing the
situation as to each claim. It follows that those Phil
Claims stand invalid and may not receive further
attention ....
But in Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston,"'
decided three years later, the Court seemed to reach a different result in considering whether there was sufficient
evidence of discovery in connection with uranium claims.
This was a suit by a senior locator to quiet title to thirteen
lode claims as against the defendant company, a junior
locator. The trial court gave summary judgment for the
plaintiff, Thurston, on the issue of discovery. The facts as
shown by plaintiff's affidavits indicated that the plaintiff
located his claims in a known uranium area in 1954. In
locating his claims he considered the general geology and
geologic conditions affecting the area generally. The plaintiff
took samples from adjoining claims and assays thereof
showed definite values; he was also able to trace a trend
onto his own claims. In the summer of 1957, the plaintiff
drilled four-inch drill holes on all of his claims adjacent
to existing discovery pits and probed the drill holes with a
radiometric device. Each probe showed a positive reaction
in two zones where miners in the area relied on radiometric
readings to indicate uranium ore. The plaintiff also relied
on visual samples taken from the drill holes before the
defendant entered and attempted to locate in October, 1957.
An assay made after the suit was begun showed varying
amounts of UaOs in the samples taken from the drill holes.
There was also evidence of commercial production both north
and south of plaintiff's claims.
In affirming a summary judgment for the plaintiff on
the issue of discovery, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
District Judge Guthrie, acknowledged that a discovery could
not have been based on any one of the plaintiff's acts, but
emphasized that, taken together, the facts tended to sustain
201. 355 P.2d 877 (Wyo. 1960).
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the plaintiff's claim of discovery. Consistent with its earlier

decision in the Globe case, the Court reiterated that radiometric readings do not constitute a discovery, but conceded
that they are important facts when considered with other
existing facts to confirm what might not be otherwise sufficient evidence. " ' Liberally construed in favor of the first
to locate, the Court had no difficulty in upholding not only
Thurston's discoveries, but the summary judgment in his
favor on this issue as well, summing up the law as to the
sufficiency of a discovery, as between competing locators,
as follows :203

There is no reason to conclude that the trial
court based its findings upon any particular one of
these evidentiary facts nor is there any reason to
believe that the court should or did ignore the many
combined pertinent facts and factors which were disclosed by the plaintiff's showing on the motion for
summary judgment and which so definitely, on the
facts herein, distinguish this case from the Globe
case.
It may be conceded that a discovery could not
be based on any one of the above facts but they
are all relevant facts which should be considered as
component parts of an assemblage of physical facts
which might and would "justify a reasonably prudent man in expending money and effort in further
exploration or development." For this court to rule
otherwise would require it to adopt a position that
a man or men engaging in a specialized business can
never be reasonably prudent men unless their
methods and operation follow the court's concept of
the proper manner of conducting their business and
substituting the judgment of the court for experts
in their respective fields.
...While no case examined allows the predication of a discovery solely on radiometric readings,
the importance of such readings, when taken into
consideration with other facts and factors, is universally recognized. To fail to do so is to deny
progress or recognize that scientific tools by con202. The Court relied primarily upon comparable cases from Colorado, Nevada,
and Utah. Dallas v. Fitzsimmons, 137 Colo. 196, 323 P.2d 274 (1958);
Berto v. Wilson, 74 Nev. 128, 324 P.2d 843 (1958); Rummell v. Bailey, 7
Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958).
203. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 382 (Wyo.
1960) (emphasis by the Court).
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tinued use and experience can and usually do evolve
from unreliability to respected accuracy when properly applied to their ultimate uses.
No better justification for adaptation of American mining
law to modern problems could be devised. It is necessary,
however, to decide whether Thurston overrules Globe on this
point, since the two decisions are not easily reconciled.
It is not enough to say that in Thurston the Court found
substantial evidence which, when taken with the radiometric
readings, was sufficient to establish discovery in favor of
the first locator, since the Court in Globe made no effort
to favor the first locator in this regard. The distinction
between the two cases lies, we believe, in another issue, which
the Court found to be decisive in Globe and which it hardly
considered in Thurston. In Globe, the first locator failed to
establish discovery of rock in place; but in Thurston the Court
assumed the samples taken by the plaintiff from deep drill
holes to be from rock in place when it considered the radiometric readings. This is why the Court found it necessary
to consider the plaintiff's failure to comply with the 1955
drill-hole law when he drilled his deep holes in 1957,"'4 notwithstanding its conclusion that the plaintiff's 1954 discovery
pits disclosed the upper Wind River formation, which it
recognized as "rock in place and where mineralization occurs
All of the pits on the claims cut into
. . . [as] a lode..'.'
the formation, but there was no evidence that any of them
disclosed anything other than higher-than-normal radiometric
readings. Since the drill holes disclosed ore before the defendant located, the pits were of minor significance. In Globe,
the plaintiff lost as to those claims where he failed to sample
and assay what his pits disclosed; in Thurston the plaintiff
won because he did sample and assay what his drill holes
disclosed. So one can only conclude that the drill holes in
Thurston were assumed to cut rock in place because the surface
pits exposed rock in place identified as the target formation
and that the absence of drill holes and evidence of rock in
place as to most of the claims in the Globe case distinguishes
these two cases.
204. See supra at note 177.
205. Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 385 (Wyo.
1960). See also Sherwood & Greer, supra note 2, at n.126.
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0
This brings us finally, and logically, to Phillipsv. Brill,"'
decided in 1908 by the Wyoming Supreme Court. This is
one of the most interesting decisions in American mining
law and compels our attention because it anticipates, in a
way, modern hard rock exploration methods, even thoughor perhaps because-it was, like so many cases in the Wyoming courts of sixty years ago, an oil placer case.

Phillips and three others located two adjacent eighty-acre
tracts as association oil placer claims, in advance of making
a discovery on either claim. Several months later, Brill and
seven others located a 160-acre claim comprised of all of the
southerly Phillips claim, half of the northerly Phillips claim,
and forty acres adjacent to but outside the southerly Phillips
claim, the Brill claim being based on a discovery made a
week earlier on the forty acres not included in either of the
Phillips claims, only the southerly one of which, the "Ravensbury," was at issue in the case, the Brill group having
adversed the application of the Phillips group for patent.
The Phillips group based their right to patent upon a discovery which they made after the Brill location in a well
which they commenced upon the boundary line of their two
adjoining claims on the same day the Brill group located the
ground. The Phillips well was bisected at the surface by the
dividing line between the two claims, but Brill made no
attempt to prove that the well deviated in its downward
course away from the "Ravensbury" and the Court refused
to infer that it did.2"' It also refused to decide whether one
well could be used to validate two placer claims on the basis
of a discovery made therein, and we can only infer from
the decision what rule the Court might have applied in a
true boundary-line discovery case where the owner of two
adjacent claims attempts to apportion half of his drill hole
discovery to each claim."'
We can comprehend no reason why an owner of two
adjacent, or even non-adjacent, claims cannot collar an inclined drill hole on one of his claims, or elsewhere, and drill
through one claim into the other, intersecting ore in both
claims. He clearly satisfies the discovery requirement as to
206. 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908).
207. See the discussion of this point at note 171 supra.
208. See note 166 eupra.
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each claim, whether he has satisfied the statutory requirement as to a discovery hole on each claim or not, assuming
the claims to be lode claims, and if the claims are placer
claims, the discovery hole statute is, as we have seen, irrelevant." 9 It would seem to us to follow, then, that the discovery
requirement is equally met in the unlikely event that the
collar of a hole is centered on the boundary line between two
claims and intersects ore in both claims vertically beneath
the collar."' So long as two discovery points are established,
one on each side of the boundary line extended vertically downward from the surface, what does it matter if they are but
an inch apart1211
In summary, the law of discovery is a complex of legal
concepts and factual components, each of which must be
satisfied if a valid discovery is to exist at all. Whether a
discovery exists or not, however, the nature and extent of the
interest acquired by location is itself a complex subject which
must await investigation at another time, in connection with
an examination of the myriad issues involving maintenance,
amendment, and relocation of mining claims.

209. See supra at notes 155, 170-172.
210. Accord, 1 AMERICAN LAw OF MINING § 4.35 (1960).
211. The minimum size drill hole permitted by Wyoming law is 1
diameter. Wyo. STAT. § 30-6(1) (1957).
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